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Aging cafes disintegrating quietly on the old roads while 
travellers drive by on the new are a familiar part of the western 
landscape. Indeed there is a history of development in the west to 
be written from its eminent domain cases. They begin with the 
railroads and irrigation systems, continue through construction of 
the interstate highway system and urban renewal in the 1960s and 
1970s, and today often concern environmental and historical 
preservation.
Both the United States Constitution and the constitutions of 
the states of the intermountain west and the Pacific Coast prohibit 
the state from taking property without paying just compensation. 
Thus, there are two basic issues in any eminent domain case. First, 
has governmental interference with property become extensive 
enough to constitute a taking that requires compensation? Second, 
how much and what kind of compensation ought to be paid? Much 
has been written on the first issue, but the second has received 
very little attention. This article is an attempt to remedy the gap 
with respect to eminent domain compensation in the western 
states.
The policy considerations underlying eminent domain com­
pensation are complex. The public needs to be able to take prop­
erty as cheaply as possible to serve valuable social ends. But if the 
public can take property too cheaply, it may take more than it 
needs. Moreover, it does not seem fair to let the government take 
advantage of its appropriative powers to gain an entrepreneurial 
edge over private competitors.1 Nor is the relative competitive po­
sition of the government the only fairness consideration at stake 
here. Fairness to the individual seems to require that he or she not
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bear a disproportionate share of the cost of a public improvement, 
especially since the property transfer is involuntary. Fairness may 
also require that “distinct, investment-backed expectations”2 be 
honored, although social justice may not look with equal favor on 
the expectations of the longstanding proprietor and the recent 
speculator upon the public improvements themselves.
The traditional textbook view is that these policy goals are 
best served by awarding the owner the fair market value of his 
property, in money. The textbook standard, however, does not 
measure the owner’s loss very well when the state’s activities have 
depressed market values, when the owner has special nonmarket- 
able uses for the property, when the loss of the property is but a 
small part of the owner’s personal or business losses, or when the 
taking leaves the owner with a truncated parcel whose usefulness 
to him has been compromised. On the other hand, the textbook 
standard may reward owners handsomely when the market has 
risen sharply, perhaps because of the improvement itself, or when 
the improvement greatly benefits the owner’s remaining land. As a 
result, courts depart from the fair market value standard, often 
without announcing that they are doing so..
This article is a critical analysis of the fair market value stan­
dard of compensation as it has been applied in the western states. 
It argues that there are identifiable classes of cases in which courts 
in the west have ignored the standard. The article begins with the 
federal constitutional background, which sets minimum limits for 
state compensation practice. It then examines some elements of 
the traditional view that are common themes in compensation 
cases in the western states. The third section analyzes some unique 
compensation practices in individual states, as deviations from the 
fair market value model. The fourth section examines the problem 
of severance damages, paid to compensate for the reduced value of 
what remains to the owner in a partial takings case, as a departure 
from the fair market value standard. The conclusion recommends 
some statutory changes with the potential to regularize some of 
these departures from fair market value.
I. F ederal  C onstitutional  B ackground
The fifth amendment, applied to the states by means of the 
fourteenth amendment, prohibits takings of property without “just
2. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda­
tion of “Just Compensation" Law, 80 H arv. L. R ev. 1165, 1233 (1967).
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compensation.”3 The federal limits are minimum standards only, 
as to both what constitutes a taking and what kind of compensa­
tion is required. Indeed, many western state constitutions require 
compensation for taking or damaging property.4 Only the constitu­
tions of Idaho, Nevada and Oregon parallel the fifth amendment’s 
takings clause.6
The Supreme Court never has precisely defined “just compen­
sation,” nor has it held that a single standard of compensation 
such as the fair market value standard is constitutionally man­
dated.6 Nevertheless, ever since the seminal case of Boom, Com­
pany v. Patterson7 the Court generally has treated the fair market 
value standard as a convenient objective measure of the property’s 
worth—a reasonable point of departure if not a final destination.
Boom Company is not a federal constitutional case; it involved 
interpretation of a just compensation clause in a state constitution 
before the fifth amendment was held to apply to the states. Its 
approval of the fair market value standard, however, generally is 
regarded as indicating the direction of further federal constitu­
tional considerations. The Company operated under a Minnesota 
state charter which granted it the right to condemn land to con­
struct log storage areas called booms; the Minnesota constitution 
prohibited condemnation without just compensation.8 The defen­
dant owned three islands with nearly a mile of shoreline, perfectly 
suited for storing logs. In the condemnation proceedings, the jury 
valued the land at $300 if used for ordinary purposes, and at an 
additional $9058.33 if used as a boom. On plaintiffs motion for a 
new trial, the trial court allowed the defendant to elect a reduced 
verdict of $5500 which the defendant did.9 The Company con­
tended that the property should be valued for its ordinary pur­
3. U.S. Const, amend. V. The fifth amendment takings clause was applied to the 
state via the fourteenth amendment in Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). 
See generally L. T ribe, American Constitutional L aw 456-59 (1978) (governmental taking 
of private property is unconstitutional unless the private owner is compensated for the tak­
ing by payment of the fair market value of the property).
4. See A l a s k a  C o n st, a rt. I, § 18; A riz. C o n st, a rt. n, § 17; C al. C o n st, a rt. I, § 14; 
C olo . C o n st, a rt. II, § 15; M o n t. C o n st, a rt. n ,  § 29; N.M . C o n st, a rt. II, § 20; U ta h  C onst. 
a rt. I, § 22; W ash. C o n st, a rt. I, § 16; Wyo. C o n st, a rt. I, § 33; see also Chicago v. Taylor, 
125 U.S. 161, 165 (1888) (Illinois s ta te  constitu tion  p roh ib its tak ing  or dam aging property).
5. See Idaho Const, a rt. I, § 14; N ev. Const, a rt. I, § 8; Or . Const, a rt. I., § 18.
6. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121,123 (1950); J. G re lin  
& D. M i l le r ,  T h e  F e d e r a l  Law  o f  E m in en t Domain § 3.1(B) (1982).
7. 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
8. Id. at 406.
9. Id. at 405.
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poses only. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court held that 
the owner was entitled to receive fair market value for the prop­
erty, “viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at 
the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is 
plainly adapted,” bearing in mind “the existing business or wants 
of the community or such as may be reasonably expected in the 
immediate future.”10 Those reasonably foreseeable uses included 
private use as a boom.
Because the fair market value standard is not constitutionally 
mandated, the Court over the years has felt free to recognize clas­
ses of cases in which market value does not necessarily prevail and 
to deviate from that standard. The Court seems to recognize that 
market value often does not fit very well with either the owner’s 
loss or the condemnor’s gain. The cases here are not always consis­
tent and indicate very real difficulties in grappling with the fair 
market value standard.
For example, when the owner makes special use of the prop­
erty, market value does not measure the owner’s loss accurately. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has mandated compensation for 
marketable special uses. In Almota Farmers Elevator & Ware­
house Co. v. United States,11 the Court awarded compensation for 
improvements under a leasehold agreement. The farmer defen­
dants had operated a grain elevator since 1919 on land possessed 
under a succession of leases from a railroad. They had no right of 
renewal under the lease, but renewals had been standard and were 
reasonably expected to continue because it was in the railroad’s 
interest to promote grain shipments.12 When the United States 
condemned the land, the compensation issue was how to measure 
the value of the defendant’s improvements: by loss of use under 
the unexpired term of the lease, or by the market value of the im­
provements under the expectation that the lease would be re­
newed.13 In rejecting the government’s theory that expectancy of 
renewal is not a compensable legal interest, the Court emphasized 
the role the improvements would play in enhancing value in the 
eyes of a willing buyer.14
The Court has not, however, gone so far as to require compen­
sation for special uses that are nonmarketable. In United States v.
10. Id. at 408.
11. 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
12. Id. at 475.
13. Id, at 472.
14. Id. at 474.
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564.54 Acres of Land,15 for example, the Court considered whether 
just compensation requires replacement value of the property. The 
Lutheran Church operated three summer camps used in part for 
summer programs for inner city children. The Church argued that 
market value recovery (found by the jury to be $740,000)16 would 
fall far short of replacement costs (estimated at $5.8 million) be­
cause the camps were exempt from certain regulations under 
grandfather clauses.17 The cost of substitute facilities was argued 
to be the appropriate measure of compensation because the prop­
erty was devoted to a public use.18 The Supreme Court held that 
no more than fair market value was required; market value repre­
sents a fairly objective measure of the owner’s loss and need not 
“include the special value of property to the owner arising from its 
adaptability to his particular use.”19 The Court explicitly left open 
whether the cost of substitute facilities is an appropriate measure 
of compensation for public condemnees;20 Justice White’s concur­
rence suggested that fair market value should apply even to public 
condemnees.21
The Court also has not required compensation for uses that 
depend upon the government’s exercise of its condemnatory pow­
ers, even when the uses themselves are marketable. In Olson v. 
United States,22 for example, the United States sought to con­
demn a flowage easement to regulate lake levels under a treaty 
with Canada. The defendant contended that recovery should take 
into account the shoreline’s special adaptability for use as a reser­
voir. The Court held that the owner “is entitled to be put in as 
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken,” 
but need not be compensated for features of his property which do 
not affect its market value.28 While his land was physically adapted 
for use as a reservoir,24 it was neither “a legal [nor a] practical pos­
15. 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
16. Id. at 509.
17. Id. at 508.
18. Id. at 509.
19. Id. at 511-12.
20. Id. at 509 n.3, 516.
21. Id. at 518. The theory here is that the public entity will be required to replace the 
facilities. See generally Note, The Cost of Substitute Facilities as a Measure of Just Com­
pensation When There is a Private Condemnee, 1975 D uke L.J. 1133 (suggesting that cost 
of substitute facilities measure of compensation may be extended in the future to privately 
owned nonprofit facilities).
22. 292 U.S. 246 (1933).
23. Id. at 256-57.
24. Id. at 256.
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sibility [that] he or some other person or persons—other than the 
expropriating authority—could have acquired the right to flood the 
lands necessary for the lawful raising of the lake.”25 Similarly, 
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson26 reemphasized that fair 
market value may reflect uses of the land combined with other par­
cels, but only when there is a reasonable probability of the combi­
nation without use of the power of eminent domain.27 The owner 
possessed a small hydroelectric power plant and land at four dam 
sites.28 The lands had cost $277,821.56, and in addition the owner 
had invested $1,061,942.53 in their potential development.29 The 
owner contended that their value should be set by considering 
their use as part of a complex, four-dam power project. The Su­
preme Court refused to consider that proposed use, in spite of the 
fact that the defendant had been granted the power of eminent 
domain by the state of North Carolina, because the owner was not 
entitled to compensation for benefits stemming from the privilege 
of the eminent domain power.30 The Court likened the loss of the 
defendant’s investment to noncompensable business losses.31
The Supreme Court also has refused to require compensation 
awards to take into account increments in value due to revocable 
governmental permits. In United States v. Fuller,32 defendants op­
erated a large ranch of over 1280 acres owned in fee simple abso­
lute, 12,027 acres leased from Arizona and 31,461 acres held under 
Taylor Grazing Acts permits. The United States condemned 920 
acres of the fee lands and argued that compensation should not 
include increases in value of land attributable to their use in con­
junction with the Taylor Act lands. The Supreme Court agreed, 
noting that the government should not be required to pay compen­
sation for benefits created by its own permits.33 Justice Powell’s 
dissent argued persuasively that the Court had departed from the 
fair market value approach, because a willing buyer would pay 
more for base lands with accessibility to Taylor Act lands.34
Distortions in the market such as those resulting from govern-
25. Id. at 260.
26. 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
27. Id. at 276-78.
28. Id. at 268.
29. Id. at 269 & n.l.
30. Id. at 281.
81. Id. at 283.
32. 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
33. Id. at 492-93.
34. Id. at 498 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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ment activities or private monopolies are another serious problem 
for the fair market value standard. The Court generally has de­
clined to figure compensation awards on the basis of actual market 
values that reflect such dislocations. For example, the Court has 
held that the Constitution does not require awards to include spec­
ulation on inclusion of property in the project for which condem­
nation is sought, although they should include general market 
value increases within an area.85 The Court has likened market 
value enhancement resulting from emergency wartime needs to 
speculation on government activities, and denied compensation for 
the increases in market value.36
Most recently, the Court did not reach the issue of whether a 
landlord’s monopoly position should be taken into account in cal­
culating compensation awards.37 New York law required landlords 
to allow cable television installation and limited their payment de­
mands to amounts fixed as reasonable by the State Commission on 
Cable Television. The issue argued before the Court was whether 
compensation was required for the minimal intrusion of the cable 
wiring.38 The Court held that compensation was required for per­
manent physical occupation of property, no matter how minimal.89 
Before state regulation, landlords commonly had received five per­
cent of the cable revenues but the Commission allowed only a 
nominal fee.40 Declining to express a view about what compensa­
tion amount would be just, the Court remanded the issue of the 
proper compensation award to the state courts.41
When the owner suffers business losses as a result of condem­
nation, the fair market value standard may not reflect his full loss. 
The Supreme Court has insisted on compensation for business 
losses when the government becomes entrepreneur of the enter­
prise, but not when condemnation brings the business to an end. 
Indeed, in the first major compensation case to follow Boom Com­
pany, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,42 the court 
looked to the owner’s loss as a measure of compensation when the
35. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,377 (1943) (California Central Valley Recla­
mation Project).
36. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1949).
37. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
38. Id. at 421.
39. Id. at 441.
40. Id. at 423.
41. Id. at 441.
42. 148 U.S. 312 (1892).
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government acquired a business.43 The company operated locks in 
the Monongahela River under charter from the state of Pennsylva­
nia. The locks were a costly but major improvement to river navi­
gation and were apparently quite profitable.44 The United States 
took over and continued to operate the defendant’s improvements; 
however, the United States statutes authorizing the condemnation 
explicitly excluded the corporation’s franchise to collect tolls from 
the estimate of value.45 The Supreme Court held that “just com­
pensation” under the fifth amendment must return to the owner 
the “full and perfect equivalent” of the property he had lost.46 
Here, a critical element of the property’s value to the owner was 
the franchise and the profits its use brought47 Thus, the condem­
nation award must include compensation for loss of the franchise. 
The Court, however, expressed no view about the compensation 
that would be required had the state taken the property but left 
the business alone.48
In United States v. Mitchell,*9 the Court returned to the 
question left open in Monongahela Navigation of whether the fifth 
amendment requires’compensation for destruction of a business. 
Defendants’ land was suitable for growing a very special kind of 
corn, but unfortunately also was needed for the military.80 Com­
pensation was granted for the value of the acreage but not for loss 
of the canning business. Following Boom Co., the Court held that 
special uses of the property must be considered as they affect mar­
ket value, but that the defendant was not entitled to compensation 
for business losses, absent statutory authorization.61
In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,62 the Court faced 
the problem of compensation for a temporary takeover of a busi­
ness by the government. The United States had condemned a 
laundry for military use for a limited period. The defendant’s 
award included annual rent and damage beyond ordinary wear and 
tear.63 No award was given for loss of trade routes or patrons,
43. Id. at 342-43.
44. Id. at 318, 324.
45. Id. at 313.
46. Id. at 326.
47. Id. at 328.
48. Id. at 337.
49. 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
50. Id. at 343.
51. Id. at 344-45.
52. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
53. Id. at 4.
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made likely by the fact that the defendant had to suspend opera­
tions during the government’s use.64 The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that compensation for going concern value was constitu­
tionally mandated when the government had taken over the busi­
ness.66 Unlike management skill, business good will is transferable 
for a time, and would be taken into account by a potential pur­
chaser of the enterprise.66 The difficulty in this case, however, was 
that the government did not intend to operate the laundry in com­
petition with the private sector; the defendant was not legally pre­
cluded from opening up “Kimball Laundry” elsewhere. Nonethe­
less, the Court held that in temporarily taking over the defendant’s 
capital investment in facilities, the government had effectively pre­
cluded relocation and therefore was required to pay compensa­
tion.67 The defendant, however, must prove the loss of going con­
cern value68 and may do so on the basis of records of past earnings, 
income and expenditure on good will.69
In Kimball Laundry, the compensation award included busi­
ness losses despite the fact that the taking was only temporary. 
There is good reason to speculate that the Court will continue to 
apply the same general compensation standards to temporary and 
permanent takings. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Di­
ego,*0 the city had categorized as “open space” land acquired by 
the utility for use as a nuclear power plant.61 The Court held that 
the state court’s refusal to award compensation in this inverse con­
demnation suit was not a final judgment on the merits, and so did 
not reach the issue of whether compensation rather than invalida­
tion of the regulation is the only permissible remedy for a regula­
tory taking. Had the issue been reached on the merits, however, 
five of the Justices in all likelihood would have required the state 
to compensate the owner fully for the duration of the regulatory 
taking.62
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id, at 10.
57. Id. at 14.
58. Id. at 20.
59. Id. at 16-19.
60. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
61. Id. at 624-25.
62. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 658-59 (Brennan, J.t dissenting). Sev­
eral federal courts subsequently have agreed with this view. See, e.g., In re Air crash in Bali, 
Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982) (criticizing California’s 
view that invalidation of the regulation will suffice as a remedy); Fountain v. Metropolitan 
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (11th Cir. 1982) (inverse condemnation
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Finally, the Court has held that compensation awards must 
take into account the impact of the taking on land remaining to 
the defendant, but may set off benefits received from the project. 
In Bauman v. Ross,™ Congress had authorized the District of Co­
lumbia to adopt a uniform subdivision plan together with plans for 
a permanent system of highways.64 In cases of partial takings, the 
act allowed benefits from the planned use of the taken parcel to be 
set off against both damages paid for the reduced value of the own­
er’s remaining land and the recovery for the land taken itself.66 
The Court held that it would be unjust to the owner not to com­
pensate him for the loss in value of his remaining land.66 Corre­
spondingly, it would be unjust to the public to interpret the fifth 
amendment to prohibit set offs, in effect giving the owner a wind­
fall benefit of more than the value of what he has lost.67
This windfall is especially ironic in contrast to the plights of 
some of the condemnee’s potential neighbors. The neighbor’s land 
may dimmish greatly in value as a result of the taking, for exam­
ple, because it is less advantageously placed for attracting custom­
ers or because the entire condemned parcel is to be used industri­
ally. Yet the neighbor will be entitled to no compensation if none 
of his actual parcel was taken. Nor need he be compensated for 
losses resulting from the uses of condemned parcels that were not 
originally his.68
In sum, the minimum limits set by federal constitutional hold­
ings coalesce around the fair market value standard. Compensation 
must be full market value, for uses for which the land is reasonably 
adaptable and available, without relying on the use of governmen­
tal powers. Replacement cost is not required for special use or pub­
lic use property unless the defendant is under a legal obligation to 
replace the facility, and perhaps not even then. Compensation 
awards need not allow benefits for increments of value resulting
action to compel payment of just compensation for property seized or impaired is proper 
when an individual is deprived of his property without instituting formal condemnation pro­
ceedings to force the transfer of title); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (city is not entitled to legislative immunity from damage arising from its zoning 
regulations that results in the “taking” of private properly for public use without just 
compensation).
63. 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
64. Id. at 550-51.
65. Id. at 557.
66. Id. at 550-51.
67. Id. at 574-75.
68. Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 371 (1924).
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from inclusion of the land within the project, the government’s 
pressing need or, most likely, other market dislocation. Compensa­
tion need not include consequential damages such as loss of profits 
or business good will unless the government actually takes over the 
business. It is likely, although not certain, that the same rules will 
be applied to compensation for regulatory takings.
II. T h e  T r a d it io n a l  F a ir  M a r k e t  V a lu e  A p p roach
Some textbook propositions about eminent domain compensa­
tion are common practice in the twelve western states treated in 
this article. The basic rule is that just compensation is the money 
equivalent of the market value of the property.69 This value is 
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, in view of all uses 
for which the property is presently adapted or reasonably availa­
ble.70 The owner’s plans for the property are relevant to valuation 
only insofar as they would bear on a willing purchaser’s decision.71 
Sentimental value of the property is noncompensable; market 
value is thought of as an objective measure, reflecting what the 
owner actually transfers.72 Beyond these basics, the western states 
vary in the extent to which they allow compensation awards to re­
flect other economic losses to the owner, including income or rent 
from the property, profits from business conducted on the prop­
erty, loss of value to personalty, relocation expenses, loss of good
69. Uniform Eminent Domain Code §§ 1002-04,13 U.L.A. 99-105 (1980); 3 P. Nich­
o ls , P. Rohan, J. Sackman & R. Van Brunt, The Law op Eminent Domain § 8.6(1) (rev. 3d 
ed. 1979); 4 P. N ichols, P. Rohan, J. Sackman & R. Van B runt § 12.1(4); 1 L. Orgel, 
Valuation Under th e  Law of Eminent Domain § 1 (2d ed. 1953). The following are recent 
reaffirmations of the fair market value standard: Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 
P.2d 143,150 (Alaska 1971); Mastick v. State, 118 Ariz. 366, 576 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1978); Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 560 P.2d 80, 82-83 (Colo. 1977) (en 
banc); Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 619 P.2d 122,132
(1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); In re Creation of West Great Palls Flood Control
& Drainage Dist. ex rel. Greenwood, 648 P.2d 297 (Mont. 1982); State ex rel. Dep’t of High­
ways v. Olson, 76 Nev. 176, 351 P.2d 186, 191-92 (1960); Board of Comm’rs v. Vargas, 76 
N.M. 369, 415 P.2d 57, 59 (1966); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Mayem, 19 Or. 
App. 234, 526 P.2d 1390,1391 (1974); Redevelopment Agency v. Barratia, 526 P.2d 47,48-49 
(Utah 1974); State v. McDonald, 98 Wash. 2d 251, 656 P.2d 1043,1047 (1983); Coronado Oil 
Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982); C al. Civ. Proc. C ode § 1263.310 (Deering 
1981); Mont. C ode Ann. §§ 70-30-302(1), -313 (1983).
70. U nifo rm  E m in en t Domain C ode § 1004(a), 13 U.L.A. 104*05 (1980); 4 P. N ich ­
o ls , P. R ohan , J. Sackm an & D. V an B ru n t ,  supra note 69, § 12.2(1); 1 L. O rg e l, supra 
note 69, § 20.
71. 1 L. O rg e l, supra note 69, § 29.
72. 4 P. N ic h o ls , P. R ohan , J. Sackm an & D. V an B r u n t ,  supra note 69, §§ 12.2(1),
(2).
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will and loss of property specially adapted to the owner’s use. The 
traditional view, however, is that present economic return from the 
property is the only one of these losses to be reflected in compen­
sation awards, and then only as it bears on the market value of the 
property.73 The standard rationale is that loss of the land must be 
distinguished from damages to the owner; lost profits, for example, 
are thought of as speculative and dependent more on the owner’s 
efforts than on the value of the land.74
To determine the fair market value of property, three eviden­
tiary measures commonly are proposed: (1) market data about 
comparable sales; (2) capitalization of income; and (3) replacement 
cost, less depreciation.75 States in the west utilize all three of these 
measures. Only comparable sales data reflect actual market behav­
ior; and for purposes of eminent domain compensation, some states 
view it as the preferred evidence of fair market value76 despite the 
fact that real property is treated as unique for other legal pur­
poses. The alternatives to comparable sales data are introduced 
within the market value framework, however artificial such treat­
ment might be in a given case. Courts hypothesize what a buyer 
would pay for property yielding a specified income, given prevail­
ing returns on investment in the larger financial market,77 and at­
tempt to imagine what a theoretical special use customer would 
pay for property, in light of what his own construction costs would 
be.78
Both traditional and contemporary commentators have criti­
cized the fair market value standard.79 In most eminent domain
73. Id. § 12.3121; 1 L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 155.
74. 4 P. N ichols, P. R ohan, J. Sackman & D. Van B runt, supra note 69, §§ 12.3121, 
13.3(2); 1 L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 162.
75. 4 P. N ichols, P. R ohan, J. Sackman & D. Van B runt, supra note 69, § 12.1(1).
76. Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 560 P.2d 80, 82 (Colo. 1977) (en 
banc); State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19,454 P.2d 56, 59 (1969) (comparable sales 
data may rebut other estimates of value); State Highway Comm’n v. Tubbs, 147 Mont 296, 
411 P.2d 739, 742 (1966); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Martinez, 81 N.M. 442, 468 
P.2d 413, 415 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 309-10, 352 P.2d 693,695 
(1960); Chase v. City of Tacoma, 23 Wash, App. 12, 594 P.2d 943, 944-45 (1979); State 
Highway Comm’n v. McNiff, 395 P.2d 29 (Wyo. 1964); Cal. E vid. Code § 815 (Deering 
Supp. 1984). But see Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 492 P.2d 143,152 (Alaska 1971) 
(owner “entitled to put on his proof as to the various elements probative of property values 
as best he can”).
77. 4 P. N ichols, P. R ohan, J. Sackman & D. Van B runt, supra note 69, § 12.3121; 1 
L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 175.
78. 4 P. N ichols, P. R ohan, J. Sackman & D. Van B runt, supra note 69, § 12.32(2); 
1 L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 40.
79. See generally Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will and Busi­
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cases, the willing seller is a fiction; the owner may be unwilling to 
sell precisely because the property is worth more to him than to 
the hypothetical seller.80 Moreover, western eminent domain law 
was formulated in a rural setting, where the chief loss from a tak­
ing was loss of the land. Today, the personal and business losses 
caused by state confiscation often are at least as important as the 
loss of land.81 In urban renewal projects, and in rural areas of the 
west as well, dislocation may adversely affect the elderly, the eco­
nomically marginal and others least able to withstand the noncom­
pensated costs of displacement.82 These losses, however, are not 
the only concern. Valuation in terms of the property’s marketabil­
ity at best use favors developmental interests rather than conser­
vation.83 Comparable sales data especially may reflect speculation 
or dilapidation resulting from the proposed project. Finally, resort 
to alternative measures such as income capitalization or reproduc­
tion costs may take place in situations in which any market for the 
property is entirely fictional. As a result, western courts have taken 
an increasingly realistic look at whether the market value standard 
properly measures just compensation. 0
III. T h e  F a ir  M a r k e t  V a lu e  S ta n d a r d  in  t h e  W e s t e r n
S tates
Western state courts have departed from the fair market value 
standard in a variety of ways. This section details characteristic 
western state court practices in twisting or abandoning the market 
value approach. The issue of severance damages is deferred until 
the next section.
ness Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 Cornell L. R ev. 604 (1968); Bigham, “Fair Market 
Value”, "Just Compensationand the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 Vand. L. R ev. 63
(1970); Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Calif. L. 
R ev. 569 (1984); Denyer-Green, The Case Against Market Value, 11 K ingston L. R ev. 173
(1981); Slavitt, Just Compensation—Updated, 48 Conn. B.J. 241 (1974); Note, Restoration 
Costs as an Alternative Measure of Severance Damage in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 
20 H astings L.J. 800 (1969); Note, The Unsoundness of California’s Noncompensability 
Rule as Applied to Business Losses in Condemnation Cases, 20 H astings L.J. 675 (1969); 
Note, Compensation for Moving Expenses of Personal Property in Eminent Domain Pro­
ceedings, 20 H astings L.J. 749 (1969); Comment, Eminent Domain Valuation in an Age of 
Redevelopment, 67 Yale L.J. 61 (1957).
80. 1 L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 37.
81. 4 P. N ichols, P. R ohan, J. Sackman & D. Van B runt, supra note 69, § 
12.3151(5).
82. 3 P. N ichols, P. R ohan, J. Sackman & D. Van B runt, supra note 69, § 8.10.
83. Tomain, Elimination of the Highest and Best Use Principle: Another Path 
Through the Middle Way, 47 F ordham L . R ev. 307, 315 (1978).
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A. Alaska
Alaskan courts are very generous both in finding that there 
has been a taking84 and in compensating owners for losses caused 
by the taking, particularly business losses. Alaskan courts deter­
mine fair market value by considering all uses for which the prop­
erty is suitable; the property’s highest and best use, and any other 
uses, are considered to the extent that they might have value to 
potential purchasers.86 Zoning changes which were reasonably 
probable at the time the land was taken may be considered in a 
determination of the land’s highest and best use.86 Usefulness of 
the property to the taker, however, is not to be included in fair 
market value; Alaska insists that the measure of compensation is 
the owner’s loss, not the state’s allegedly unjust enrichment. Thus, 
landowners whose home was condemned for highway construction 
did not receive compensation beyond the market value of the prop­
erty, which was zoned residential, despite the state’s extensive use 
of gravel and dirt fill from the land.87
To measure market value in light of available uses, Alaska al­
lows the owner in any eminent domain case to submit evidence of 
comparable land values and sales data, net income from the prop­
erty, and the reproduction costs of improvements.88 By statute, 
Alaska precludes market value increases or decreases attributable 
to the very project for which the property is taken from influencing 
compensation awards.89 Compensation awards, however, may be 
affected considerably by other state projects, such as the construc­
tion of nearby interconnecting roads.90 Alaska also allows the land­
owner to recover the value of reasonable improvements made to 
the property before the taking, despite knowledge that condemna­
84. For example, in Grant v. State, 560 P.2d 36 (Alaska 1977), the property owner 
settled an inverse condemnation suit for $22,000 for loss of an access to the Gastineau Chan­
nel because of the construction of a highway on land not taken from him. At the time of the 
settlement, highway department plans showed a culvert under the highway permitting small 
craft passage. When the culvert collapsed and was not replaced, the owner’s successor in 
interest recovered on the theory that there had been a second taking. Id. at 39. See also 
Alsop v. State, 586 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 1978) (if prior settlement award was in reliance 
on unrestricted access, new access restrictions are a second taking; recovery is not extended 
to everyone in the vicinity regardless of prior understandings).
85. Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143,150-52 (Alaska 1971); State v. 
7.026 Acres, 466 P.2d 364, 366-67 (Alaska 1970).
86. Martens v. State, 554 P.2d 407, 409 (Alaska 1976).
87. Gackstetter v. State, 618 P.2d 564, 566 (Alaska 1980).
88. Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 150-51 (Alaska 1971).
89. Alaska Stat. § 34.60.120(3) (1975).
90. State v. Alaska Continental Dev. Corp., 630 P.2d 977, 983 (Alaska 1980).
HeinOnline -- 1984 Utah L. Rev. 442 1984
No. 3] EMINENT DOMAIN COMPENSATION 443
tion was proposed.91
One of the more unique features of Alaska compensation law 
is its liberal treatment of capitalization of income as indicative of 
market value. Alaska allows fair market value to be computed by 
capitalizing income, even when the income is projected merely 
from a reasonably probable use. Alaska thus has allowed a land 
developer’s potential income from a projected subdivision, when 
capitalized, to serve as the basis of a compensation award.92
Alaskan courts also have allowed direct recovery for business 
losses caused by a taking, even when the losses were suffered by a 
lessee. In State v. Hammer,™ the defendant’s lessee began the 
search for a new home for “Kito’s Kave” only after the state insti­
tuted condemnation proceedings. He was unable to relocate the 
bar for nine months; the state argued the interruption of business 
was noncompensable because it was personalty, because the dam­
ages were speculative and because only the land had been taken.94 
In rejecting all three theories, the court replied that Alaska re­
quires compensation for personalty, that loss of profit damages are 
not considered too speculative in other legal areas and that a dis­
tinction between the land and the business is inconsistent with 
Alaska’s view that the proper measure of compensation is “loss to 
the owner, as measured by an objective standard.”85 The court dis­
tinguished United States v. Mitchell96 on the ground that the fifth 
amendment, unlike the Alaskan Constitution, does not require 
compensation for damaging.97 Kito recovered both for the inter­
ruption of his business and for damages caused to the bar equip­
ment by the move.98
Finally, in measuring loss to the owner, Alaska includes the 
value of taken personalty.99 Personalty that is used merely on the 
land, however, and not taken or damaged, does not become part of 
a compensation award.100
91. Babinec v. State, 512 P.2d 563, 572 {Alaska 1973).
92. Dash v. State, 491 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Alaska 1971); see also City of Anchorage v. 
Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324, 1332-34 (Alaska 1975) (allowing capitalization of potential income 
from a proposed power line installation).
93. 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976).
94. Id. at 823.
95. Id. at 824.
96. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
97. 550 P.2d at 824.
98. Id. at 826.
99. Stroh v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 459 P.2d 480, 485 (Alaska 1969).
100. State v. Ness, 516 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Alaska 1973).
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B. Arizona
Arizona compensates landowners for the fair market value of 
their property, considered in light of all uses that are likely to af­
fect market value. Contiguous parcels may he valued for separate 
commercial uses, if at their highest and best use they would be 
marketed in that way.101 Projected zoning changes may bear on 
highest and best use, even though deed restrictions will not expire 
for ten years.102 The landowner’s future plans for the property are 
relevant insofar as they bear on the property’s availability for 
those uses, but not if the plans are highly speculative. Thus, a 
church was not permitted to introduce evidence of frustrated sanc­
tuary plans because there was no reasonable probability that the 
plans would be brought to fruition within the foreseeable future.108 
Uses may be considered that require improvements to the land, 
but the fair market value must reflect the “mythical” buyer’s 
knowledge of the likely costs of the improvements.104 Fair market 
value also may reflect the reasonable value of improvements made 
in good faith despite knowledge of the impending public project.105
Sales data are the primary source for a determination of fair 
market value in Arizona. Capitalization of business income is avail­
able as an alternative measure if the property itself—not simply 
the business located on it—is income producing.106 Rentals from a 
commercial lease also may be capitalized and used as a measure of 
market value, at least when distinguished from business income.107
In one case of special use property without a measurable mar­
ket value, the Arizona courts agreed that replacement cost is the 
only just compensation basis: the compensation requirement “is 
designed to protect not only the landowner’s proprietary interest, 
but also his economic interest.”108 A railroad had used access from
101. County of Maricopa v. Paysnoe, 83 Ariz. 236, 319 P.2d 995, 997 (1957).
102. Moschetti v. City of Tucson, 9 Ariz. App. 108, 449 P.2d 945, 950 (1969).
103. City of Scottsdale v. Church of the Holy Cross Lutheran, 132 Ariz. 416, 646 P.2d
301, 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
104. Mastick v. State, 118 Ariz. 366, 576 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
105. State ex rel. Herman v. Schaffer, 110 Ariz. 91, 515 P.2d 593,600 (1973) (en banc). 
Although the case is not entirely clear, it would appear that the compensation award should 
reflect the effect of the improvement on the property’s market value, rather than the costs 
of the improvement. See also City of Yuma v. Arizona Water Co., 22 Ariz. App. 4, 522 P.2d 
765, 769 (1974) (costs of improvements considered, but not necessarily conclusive).
106. City of Scottsdale v. Eller Outdoor Advertising Co., 119 Ariz. 86, 579 P.2d 590, 
597 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (billboard).
107. State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d 750, 752-53 (1963) (en banc).
108. State ex rel. Herman v. Southern Pac. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 238, 445 P.2d 186, 188
(1968).
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an adjoining public highway for track maintenance. When the ac­
cess was closed, compensation was based on the cost of a new 
road.109
Unlike Alaska, Arizona is adamant in denying compensation 
for business losses such as loss of rental,110 interruption of busi­
ness,111 costs of removal112 or damage to fixtures during reloca­
tion.113 Under an Arizona statute,114 “going concern value” is com­
pensable when a public utility is taken over by the state.11®
Like many other states, Arizona distinguishes between losses 
resulting from new or rerouted freeways and losses resulting from 
improvement of the old. Courts have declined compensation, with 
apparent regret, when highways have been rerouted116 and uni­
formly have denied compensation for other changes in traffic 
flow.117 Arizona courts do, however, grant quite extensive damages 
for decline in fair market value (though not for business losses per 
se) when property becomes less commercially viable because direct 
access to an abutting highway is cut off,118 impaired by a grade 
change,119 made more circuitous120 or even where the property be­
comes less visible.121 It is hard to see why motel owners who lose 
trade because travellers must arrive by a frontage road suffer more 
“real economic injury”122 than those bypassed when the freeway is 
moved entirely. On the other hand, highway relocation cannot be 
made prohibitively expensive by compensation awards and individ­
uals must sometimes bear the costs of progress. The theory that 
abutting owners have a right to access thus has been a convenient,
109. 445 P.2d at 189.
110. Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 39 Ariz. 470, 7 P.2d 622, 626-27 (1932).
111. State ex rel. La Prade v. Carrow, 57 Ariz. 429, 114 P.2d 891, 893 (1941).
112. State ex rel. Willey v. Chun, 91 Ariz. 317, 372 P.2d 324, 325-26 (1962).
113. 372 P.2d at 326.
114. Ariz. R ev. Stat. Ann. § 9-518(B) (1977).
115. City of Yuma v. Arizona Water Co., 22 Ariz. App. 4, 522 P.2d 765, 769 (1974); 
City of Tucson v. El Rio Water Co., 101 Ariz. 49, 415 P.2d 872, 874 (1966).
116. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Carrow, 57 Ariz. 434, 114 P.2d 896, 898 (1941).
117. Olson v. State, 12 Ariz. App. 105, 467 P.2d 945, 947-48 (1970) (median strip); 
Rutledge v. State, 100 Ariz. 174, 412 P.2d 467, 470-72 (1966) (access only via undeveloped 
streets); Rayburn v. State ex rel. Willey, 93 Ariz. 54, 378 P.2d 496, 498-99 (1963) (access 
only by one-way street).
118. State ex rel. Herman v. Hague, 10 Ariz. App. 404, 459 P.2d 321, 323 (1969).
119. State ex rel. Herman v. Mestas, 12 Ariz. App. 289, 469 P.2d 855, 863 (1970).
120. State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988, 991-92 (1960).
121. State ex rel. Herman v. Wilson, 103 Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760, 763 (1968). But see 
State ex rel. Herman v. Schaffer, 105 Ariz. 478,467 P.2d 66,74 (1970) (access circuity insuf­
ficient to warrant compensation).
122. State ex rel. Herman v. Hague, 10 Ariz. App. 404, 459 P.2d 321, 323 (1969).
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if arbitrary, dividing line between when the state must pay and 
when it need not.
C. California
In 1975, California adopted a comprehensive statute regular­
izing eminent domain law.123 The statute in the main codifies ex­
isting California practice, and has been interpreted in light of Cali­
fornia’s longstanding and extensive eminent domain litigation. It 
apparently settles some troublesome conflicts in prior California 
case law; for example, fair market value is to be figured indepen­
dently of effects from the condemnation project and certain busi­
ness losses explicitly are made compensable.
The statute provides that fair market value is the basic mea­
sure of compensation.124 Fair market value is defined by the high­
est bargained price of a willing buyer and willing seller, with full 
knowledge of all reasonably available uses of the property.125 Since 
the early case of San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Neale,126 Cali­
fornia courts have defined this scope of uses broadly. In Neale, the 
defendant owned part of a valley that was to be flooded by the 
plaintiff’s reservoir. The defendant’s property was not suitable as a 
dam site itself, and the issue was whether to admit evidence of its 
value “as a reservoir site.”127 The Company contended the evi­
dence was inadmissible because the land could only be used as a 
reservoir in conjunction with Company land. In rejecting the Com­
pany’s theory, the court distinguished between market 
value—what a willing buyer would pay—and value for a particular 
use.128 Market value typically is to be determined by comparison 
with sales of similar property, but where there have been few com­
parable sales, market value is a hypothesis about what a potential 
buyer would pay in light of all uses for which the property is suita­
ble. Since there was at least a minimal suggestion of a private mar­
ket for dam sites, use as a reservoir might be considered by a pro­
spective purchaser. Ownership was irrelevant; the market value of 
half a canyon will be the same whether the other half is owned by 
the condemnor, by the defendant, or by a third party. The court
123. Cal. Civ. P boc. Code tit. 7 (Deering 1981).
124. Id. § 1263.310.
125. Id. § 1263.320(a).
126. 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888).
127. 20 P. at 374.
128. Id.
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relied on Boom Company129 to reach this result, but failed to note 
the crucial difference that in Boom Company the defendant owned 
a block of islands suitable in themselves for construction of a 
boom.130
California has continued to allow uses of the property in com­
bination with other tracts to be considered in a determination of 
fair market value,131 even when the combined uses are possible 
only with state permission.132 All uses for which the property is 
“naturally adapted” are to be considered;133 neither the owner’s184 
nor the condemnor’s135 particular plans have any weight except to 
the extent that they suggest possible uses. Uses requiring a zoning 
change may be considered, if the change is reasonably probable.136 
One fairly recent case has even ignored permanent legal restric­
tions on use, allowing land in a city park to be valued as though 
the city were free to sell it on the open market.137 Uses for which 
demand is slight or only potential may be considered, provided the 
land is “naturally adapted” to the use.138 It is fair to say that in 
California case law “market value” has become an abstract hypo­
thetical, constructed on the basis of the property’s potential rather 
than the likelihood of actual sale.
129. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
130. 20 P. at 375.
131. People v. Murray, 172 Cal. App. 2d 219, 342 P.2d 485, 491 (1959); City of Stock­
ton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 275 P. 228, 234-35 (1929).
132. People v. Silviera, 236 Cal. App. 2d 604,46 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1965) (state consent to 
freeway access).
133. Meakin v. Steveland, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 490, 137 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366 (1977); 
People v. City of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d 345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797, 799-800 (1963); Joint 
Highway Dist. No. 9 v. Ocean Shore R.R., 128 Cal. App. 743, 18 P.2d 413, 417-18 (1933).
134. City of Los Angeles v. Retlaw Enterprises, Inc., 16 Cal. 3d 473, 546 P.2d 1380, 
1390-91, 128 Cal. Rptr. 436, 440-47 (1976); San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. 
Sweet, 255 Cal. App. 2d 889, 63 Cal. Rptr. 640, 646 (1967); People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 
738, 264 P.2d 15, 25 (1953); Central Pac. Ry. v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 92 P. 849, 852 (1907).
135. City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 558 P.2d 545, 548, 135 Cal. Rptr. 
647, 650 (1977); People v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967); 
People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d 15, 26 (1953); People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 
181 P.2d 705, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947), aff’d on other grounds, 32 Cal. 2d 406, 196 P.2d 570 
(1948); Spring Valley Water-Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 681 (1891).
136. See, e.g., City of Menlo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal. App. 2d 261, 311 P.2d 135, 138
(1957) (reasonable probability that zoning would be changed to allow construction of off- 
street parking plaza).
137. People v. City of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d 345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800-01
(1963).
138. See, e.g., Joint Highway Dist. No. 9 v.. Ocean Shore R.R., 128 Cal. App. 743, 18 
P.2d 413, 417-19 (1933) (potential private demand for abandoned right of way as railroad or 
road); City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 275 P. 228, 235-36 (1929) (potential 
private demand for reservoir site).
HeinOnline -- 1984 Utah L. Rev. 447 1984
448 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1984: 429
Under California law, valuations of property taken in eminent 
domain may be based on sales of comparable property in the 
area.139 Valuations also may encompass sales of the subject prop­
erty.140 All sales data, however, must be adjusted to exclude in­
creases or decreases in value attributable to the condemnation pro­
ject or the eminent domain proceeding at issue.141 That means that 
the owner may not benefit from the condemnor’s proposed use of 
the property, unless the property was marketable for that use 
before condemnation.142 Nor may the state benefit from its precon­
demnation activities or the condemnation proceeding itself.143
California’s complex date of valuation statute also is notewor­
thy here. The statute provides that property is to be valued as of 
the date the condemnor deposits the probable amount of compen­
sation.144 If judicial proceedings are brought, the property is valued 
as of the commencement of the trial, unless trial occurs more than 
a year after the condemnation.146 In such a delayed case, the prop­
erty is valued as of the date of trial, unless the delay was the own­
er’s fault.146 Thus, the defendant cannot speculate on the success 
of delaying tactics. Nor, under the valuation statute, should the 
state be able to delay the proceedings and thereby acquire prop­
erty more cheaply.147 This statute—unique in the western 
states—avoids problems due to changes in value during the con­
demnation process that have been handled on an equitable basis in 
some other states.148
139. Cal. E vid. Code § 816 (Deering 1966); County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 
672, 312 P.2d 680, 683 (1957).
140. Cal. E vid. Code § 815 (Deering Supp. 1984) (but not if sale occurs after filing of 
lis pendens); see City of Los Angeles v. Retlaw Enterprises, Inc., 16 Cal. 3d 473, 546 P.2d 
1380, 1384, 128 Cal. Rptr. 436, 440 (1976).
141. Cal. Civ. P roc. Code § 1263.330(a), (b) (Deering 1981); see City of Los Angeles v. 
Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 558 P.2d 545, 550, 135 Cal. Rptr. 647, 652 (1977); City of Los Ange­
les v. Retlaw Enterprises, Inc., 16 Cal. 3d 473, 546 P.2d 1380, 1384-85, 128 Cal. Rptr. 436, 
440-41 (1976); Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 6-10, 93 
Cal. Rptr. 833, 838-42 (1971).
142. Cal. Civ. P roc. Code § 1263.330(a) (Deering 1981) (Law Revision Commission 
Comment).
143. Id. § 1263.330(b), (c); see Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 
1345, 1349, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1972).
144. Cal. Civ. P roc. Code § 1263.110(a) (Deering 1981).
145. Id. § 1263.120.
146. Id. § 1263.130.
147. Id. § 1263.330(b).
148. See, e.g., Utah State Road Comm’n v. Friberg, No. 17275 (Utah filed Nov. 17, 
1983) (although statute provides for valuation as of date of service of process, in protracted 
proceedings, when land has appreciated greatly in value, properly should be valued as of 
date title transferred).
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However, California does allow speculation on other state im­
provements to augment compensation awards. For example, defen­
dants who purchased land at residential rates, intending to assem­
ble a commercial package near one freeway offramp, were allowed 
to recover the value of commercially marketable property when 
their land turned out to be within the necessary right of way of an 
intersecting freeway.149 Speculative increases in the general vicinity 
of the project may also be included in valuations, when the scope 
of the project is altered. Thus if the defendant’s land originally is 
not slated to be part of the project, and its market value increases 
because of the project, later changes in the project will require 
compensation at the higher value.160 These recoveries are defended 
by distinguishing general increases in market value in an area from 
speculation on the possibility that the property will be condemned 
for the public improvement in question.
In addition to comparable sales data, evidence of capitalized 
rental value is admissible in determinations of market value. 
Rental value must be distinguished from capitalization of income 
or profits, however, which apparently are admissible only in Cali­
fornia151 when the state takes over and continues to run an existing 
concern such as a utility.152 From an early date, California insisted 
that evidence of income from agricultural land153 was inadmissible. 
More recently, however, California has considered farm income as 
affecting market value. Thus, when a windbreak and part of a 
lemon orchard were confiscated, the court allowed evidence of the 
productivity of the lemon trees to be weighed in determining both 
the value of the taken trees and temporary severance damages for 
loss of productivity pending growth of a new windbreak.154 Califor­
nia has also allowed capitalization of income to apply to mineral 
lands when no comparable sales data were available.155
149. People v. Cramer, 14 Cal. App. 3d 513, 92 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405-06 (1971).
150. Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 11-12, 93 
Cal. Rptr. 833, 843-44 (1971).
151. Cal. Evn>. Code §§ 817-819 (Deering 1966 & Supp. 1984); see Ventura County 
Flood Control Dist v. Security First Nat’l Bank, 15 Cal. App. 3d 996,93 Cal. Rptr. 653, 654
(1971); People v. Dunn, 46 CaL 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964, 966 (1956).
152. South Bay Irrigation Diat. v. Califomia-Am. Water Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 944,133 
Cal. Rptr. 166, 190 (1976). .
153. Stockton & Copperopolis R.R. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139 (1874).
154. Ventura County Flood Control Dist v. Security First Nat’l Bank, 115 Cal. App. 
3d 996, 93 Cal. Rptr. 653, 655-56 (1971); see also City of Salinas v. Homer, 106 Cal. App. 3d
309, 165 Cal. Rptr. 65, 67 (1980) (approving Ventura County).
155. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Flintkote Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 97, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 27, 31 (1968).
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Together with comparable sales data and capitalization of 
rental value, reproduction cost is the third factor admissible in 
California for a determination of market value.166 The 1975 Cali­
fornia statute provides that property is to be taken at its fair mar­
ket value if there is a relevant market, and otherwise assessed by 
any “just and equitable” method.167 This statute must be read 
against a background in which California courts have not treated 
reproduction costs entirely consistently. Initially, reproduction 
costs were admitted as relevant to the valuation of special use 
property:
[W]hen it appears that property is improved so as to make it pecu­
liarly adaptable for its highest available use and there may be said 
to be a market for the property for such use, the cost of reproduc­
tion of such improvements becomes a factor in the determination of 
market value . . . .  This does not mean, however, that such cost of 
reproduction is the market value of the land, for other factors, in­
cluding demand, enter into the ultimate determination of market 
value.108
In Joint Highway Dist. No. 9 v. Ocean Shore R.R.,169 the state con­
demned an abandoned railroad line for a highway; the roadbed had 
been difficult to construct and provided the state with about 95% 
of the grading needed for the highway. The property was worth 
little as bare land, but the jury was allowed to consider the approx­
imate $250,000 cost of roadbed construction as it might affect a 
potential purchaser.160
Very shortly, however, California courts limited the Joint 
Highway precedent. In City of Los Angeles v. Klinker,161 the court 
denied reproduction costs for both a building specially constructed 
to bear the weight of newspaper presses and presses set into specif­
ically designed foundations. Although it certainly was arguable 
that the property was designed for the newspaper’s peculiar needs, 
the court held that these features of design could be considered 
only as they affected fair market value and refused to admit evi­
dence of reproduction costs. The court distinguished Joint High­
way by saying:
156. Cal. E vid. Code § 820 (Deering 1966).
157. Cal. Civ. P roc. Code § 1263.320(b) (Deering 1981).
158. Joint Highway Dist. No. 9 v. Ocean Shore R.R., 128 Cal. App. 743, 18 P.2d 413, 
419 (1933).
159. 128 Cal. App. 743, 18 P.2d 413 (1933).
160. 18 P.2d at 419.
161. 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933).
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Exceptions to this general rule [that reproduction costs are inadmis­
sible] might be allowed where, under peculiar circumstances not 
here present, as by reason of the nature of the improvement itself, 
no other criterion would be appropriate for establishing the market 
value of the property other than the structural value or the recon­
struction cost.162
Perhaps the cases are distinguishable because in Joint Highway 
the state was planning to use the value of the improvements, but 
the court does not say so. Several more recent California cases 
have continued to reject reproduction costs as an accurate measure 
of market value.163
On the other hand, there is a series of cases in which Califor­
nia has allowed reproduction costs into evidence. Some of those 
cases allow reproduction costs to be considered only as they bear 
on what a buyer would be willing to pay for the property.164 Other 
cases have allowed costs of restoration as a direct measure of dam­
ages when they are less than the decline in market value.166 For 
example, the owner of a lemon grove was allowed the costs of re­
planting a confiscated windbreak.166 These cases might be ex­
plained as granting reproduction costs only when they result in a 
lesser recovery than market value depreciation. It also may have 
been significant that they all involved compensation for severance 
damages in partial takings.
A more recent case,167 however, appears to be an unambiguous 
endorsement of reproduction costs. A railroad right of way, used 
also as a utility pipeline, was taken for a highway. Although rail­
road use could have continued, utility use and planned oil and coal 
slurry pipeline use were foreclosed. The defendant recovered
162. 25 P.2d at 832; see also People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal. 2d 406,196 P.2d 570, 
584 (1948) (viewing Joint Highway as measuring compensation by market value).
163. South Bay Irrigation Dist. v. California-Am, Water Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 944,133 
Cal. Rptr, 166, 187-88 (1976) (capitalization of income as measure of compensation for a 
utility company taken over by irrigation district); City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist 
Church, 1 Cal. App. 3d 384, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 n.l (1969) (error to allow testimony of repro­
duction cost of church).
164. People v. Hayward Bldg. Materials Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782, 
787 (1963); Steiger v. City of San Diego, 163 Cal. App. 2d 110, 329 P.2d 94, 99 (1958).
165. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Flintkote Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 97, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 27, 33 (1968); People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 378, 63 
Cal. Rptr. 138, 142-43 (1967).
166. Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat’l Bank, 15 Cal. App. 3d 
996, 93 Cal. Rptr. 653, 655-67 (1971).
167. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 315,
148 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978).
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$183,636, the project cost of reproducing the “transportation corri­
dor.”168 The compensation included the costs of replacing the 
taken land as well as the costs of reproducing improvements. The 
court emphasized that the California statute requires compensa­
tion to be determined by any just and equitable method when 
there is no market for the condemned parcel.169
Before the 1975 statute, California courts generally adhered to 
the view that business losses such as loss of good will or profits 
were noncompensabie,170 although they might bear on the prop­
erty’s suitability for a particular use.171 Moving expenses and the 
cost of locating a new site were likewise noncompensabie,172 as 
were increased costs of use, unless they affected market value.178
The California eminent domain statute now provides that the 
owner of a business may receive compensation for provable loss of 
good will caused by any taking if the loss cannot reasonably be 
prevented by relocation or prudent management.174 Prospective 
application of the provision has been held not to violate equal pro­
tection.176 Relocation assistance176 aside, other business losses such 
as lost profits remain noncompensabie in California, except insofar 
as they affect theoretical market value.
Finally, California provides recovery for loss of access or for 
unreasonable circuity of access. Mere changes in traffic patterns
168. 148 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
169. Id. at 541.
170. Cases holding that loss of business was not a taking included Hladek v. City of 
Merced, 69 Cal. App. 3d 585, 138 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1977); Peerless Stages, Inc. v. Santa Cruz 
Metropolitan Transit Dist., 67 Cal. App. 3d 343,136 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1977) (no right to com­
pensation for lost business due to competition); Hecton v. People, 58 Cal. App. 3d 653,130 
Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976); Parking Auth. v. Nicovich, 32 Cal. App. 3d 420, 108 Cal. Rptr. 137
(1973). There was, however, one well known eminent domain case in which the California 
lower court at least was tempted to compensate for business losses. See Community Redev. 
Agency v. Abrams, 41 Cal. App. 3d 608,116 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1974), rev’d, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 
P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975).
171. Orange County Flood Control Dist. v. Sunny Crest Dairy, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 3d 
742, 143 Cal. Rptr. 803, 812 (1978); People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Giumarra Vine­
yards Corp., 245 Cal. App. 2d 309,53 Cal. Rptr. 902,909 (1966); People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. 
Works v. Alexander, 212 Cal. App. 2d 84, 27 Cal. Rptr. 720, 728-29 (1963); City of Oakland 
v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705, 708 (1915).
172. Parking Auth. of Sacramento v. Nicovich, 32 Cal. App. 3d 420,108 Cal. Rptr. 137, 
138 (1973); Town of Los Gatos v. Sund, 234 CaL App. 2d 24, 44 Cal. Rptr. 181, 182-83
(1965).
173. People v. Lundy, 238 Cal. App. 2d 354, 47 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696 (1965).
174. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1263.510 (Deering 1981).
175. Carson Redev. Agency v. Wolf, 99 Cal. App. 3d 239, 160 Cal. Rptr. 213, 216-17 
(1979).
176. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 7262 (Deering 1982).
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caused by median strips, traffic islands, one way streets,1”  or even 
road relocation178 are noncompensable unless they impair easement 
of access, an ownership right. The test applied by the California 
courts is one of reasonableness.179 Unlike some other states, Cali­
fornia will allow a finding that access rights of nonabutting owners 
have been unreasonably impaired.180 For a time, California courts 
appeared to hold that closure of access at one end of a street was 
compensable for all owners of frontage up to the next intersecting 
street.181 The courts now will treat some cases in which a street 
becomes a cul de sac as cases of impaired access, depending on the 
extent of the interference.182 There are also cases in which loss of 
visibility or view have been held compensable infringements of ac­
cess rights.188 These access cases often involve business losses such 
as the situation of a cafe that is no longer positioned to attract 
patronage. They are thus a likely forum for owners to seek to prove 
loss of business goodwill or changes in market values when the 
land is less commercially attractive.
D. Colorado
The touchstone for compensation awards in Colorado is what 
the property would bring in a “free marketplace.”184 Property is to 
be valued at the most advantageous use to which it reasonably may 
be applied.186 Thus stated, the standard is relatively generous to 
owners, but in a number of ways Colorado courts have insisted on 
linking most advantageous use theoretically to marketability. For
177. City of Berkeley v. von Adelung, 214 CaL App. 2d 791, 29 Cal. Rptr. 802, 803
(1963); People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 CaL 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 523-24, 5 
Cal. Rptr. 151, 155-56 (1960).
178. City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. App. 760, 31 P.2d 467,467-69 (1934); Peo­
ple v. Gianni, 130 Cal. App. 584, 20 P.2d 87, 89-90 (1933).
179. People v. Becker, 262 CaL App. 2d 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114-16 (1968) (change 
from state road access to freeway frontage not unreasonable); People v. Giumarra Vineyards 
Corp., 245 Cal. App. 2d 309, 53 Cal. Rptr. 902, 904, 909 (1966) (seven-mile route to defen­
dant’s packing shed unreasonably circuitous).
180. But see People v. Russell, 48 Cal. 2d 189, 309 P.2d 10, 14-15 (1957) (property 
owner’s right of access did not extend beyond the next intersection at either end of the 
street on which the property abuts).
181. See Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
182. Briedert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 CaL 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 722-24, 39 Cal. Rptr. 
903, 906-08 (1964).
183. People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390,144 P.2d 799, 803-04 (1943); Williams v. Los 
Angeles Ry., 150 Cal. 592, 89 P. 330, 332 (1907).
184. City of Aurora v. Webb, 41 Colo. App. 11, 585 P.2d 288, 291 (1978).
185. Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 192 Colo. 422, 560 P.2d 80, 83 (1977)
(en banc) (citation omitted).
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example, property must be treated as a unit in determination of its 
most advantageous use; Colorado regards valuations as too specu­
lative if they are based on carving up the property into separate 
lots or valuing separately the various improvements and other at­
tributes of the property.186 Likewise, zoning changes, if reasonably 
probable, may be taken into account in conjecturing the property’s 
best use.187 However, the court also must be allowed to consider 
the costs of taking advantage of the zoning change.188
This link to marketability is notable especially in Colorado’s 
treatment of property with special features. Colorado will only al­
low improvements to be considered insofar as they affect market 
value,189 and insists that costs of demolishing unwanted improve­
ments must be taken into account as they affect an interested 
buyer.190 Conversely, replacement costs of improvements may be 
considered in compensation awards only to the extent that they 
alter market value.191 Restoration or relocation costs also are not 
required as compensation in Colorado. They are to be considered 
only as they bear on fair market value.192 The need to replace 
fences or move fixtures may be considered, but only as the willing 
buyer would contemplate them in deciding what to pay for the 
property. Even if property is adapted to a unique use or is of 
unique historical value, evidence of replacement cost is inadmissi­
ble “absent a reasonable expectation that the building would be 
replaced.”193
186. City of Boulder v. Orchard Court Dev. Co., 527 P.2d 931, 933 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1974); Board of County Comm’rs v. Vail Assocs., Ltd., 171 Colo. 381, 468 P.2d 842, 846 
(1970) (en banc); Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402, 404-05
(1968).
187. State Dep’t of Highways v. Ogden, 638 P.2d 832, 833 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); City 
of Aurora v. Webb, 41 Colo. App. 11, 585 P.2d 288, 291 (1978); Poudre School Dist. R-l v. 
Stark, 35 Colo. App. 363, 536 P.2d 832, 834 (1975).
188. City of Aurora v. Webb, 41 Colo. App. 11, 585 P.2d 288, 291 (1978).
189. Board of County Comm’rs v. Loyd Hodge & Sons, Inc., 534 P.2d 638, 639 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1975); City of Boulder v. Orchard Court Dev. Co., 527 P.2d 931,933 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1974).
190. Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 192 Colo. 422, 560 P.2d 80, 83-84
(1977) (en banc).
191. City of Boulder v. Orchard Court Dev. Co., 527 P.2d 931, 933 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1974).
192. Board of County Comm’rs v. Loyd Hodge & Sons, Inc., 534 P.2d 638, 639 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1975); City and County of Denver v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 493 P.2d 348, 351
(1972); Dandrea v. Board of County Comm’rs, 144 Colo. 343, 356 P.2d 893, 896-97 (1960); 
see also Game & Fish Comm’n v. Farmers Irrigation Co., 162 Colo. 301,426 P.2d 562, 565-66 
(1967) (restoration costs available as a measure of damages for suit in tort).
193. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Pogzeba, 38 Colo. App. 168, 558 P.2d 442, 443
(1976).
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Comparable sales data are the basic evidence of market 
value,104 with increases in the market attributable to the fact of 
condemnation factored out.195 Nor may a landowner enhance the 
value of his own land by comparing it with sales prices of neigh­
boring parcels which already reflect the impact of the proposed 
improvement.196
Colorado will allow into evidence factors other than compara­
ble sales data. Capitalization of reasonable rate of return from 
rental is available as an alternative even when market data are 
available,197 whether or not the property is rented at the market 
rate.198 Despite this relative liberality, however, Colorado has not 
gone so far as to allow business losses per se to be compensated. 
Capitalization of rental must be carefully distinguished from the 
effort to recover lost rents themselves; lost rents are viewed as non­
compensabie business. losses.199 Evidence of the character and 
amount of business conducted on the land, as well as profits and 
losses, is admissible only to show possible use of the property, not 
to show fair market value.200 Gross sales data are also rejected by 
the Colorado courts as too dependent on managerial skill and too 
speculative to serve as a measure of the value of the land.201
Colorado, however, has made income from the land itself into 
a major exception to the rule that business losses are noncompen­
sabie. Farm income from crops and livestock is regarded as income 
from the land itself, not from business conducted on the land.202 
Thus, where the defendant’s business was ranching, evidence con­
cerning the decreased carrying capacity of the land was admissible 
because “the income in question [is] derived from the use of the 
property itself.”203 Income from rental of the real property itself,
194. Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 192 Colo. 422, 560 P.2d 80, 82 n.l
(1977) (en banc).
195. 560 P.2d at 83 (citation omitted).
196. Board of County Comm’rs v. Vail Assocs., Ltd., 171 Colo. 381, 468 P.2d 842, 847 
(1970) (en banc).
197. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Bergland-Cherne Co., 93 Colo. 562, 568 P.2d 478, 
481 (1977) (en banc).
198. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. City of Sterling, 185 Colo. 238, 523 P.2d 465, 468
(1974).
199. Board of County Comm’rs v. Loyd Hodge & Song, Inc., 534 P.2d 638, 640 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1975).
200. City and County of Denver v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 493 P.2d 348, 351 (1972); 
City and County of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929).
201. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Cook, 186 Colo. 182, 526 P.2d 652, 653 (1974).
202. Board of County Comm’rs v. Delaney, 41 Colo. App. 548, 592 P.2d 1338, 1340
(1978); City and County of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. I ll, 113 P.2d 999, 1001 (1941).
203. Board of County Comm’rs v. Delaney, 41 Colo. App. 548, 592 P.2d 1338, 1340
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such as a trailer pad (but not the trailer), also is admissible.204
Under the Colorado constitution, recovery is available for 
damage to property without actual confiscation.206 Damage in such 
cases must be tied to the loss of a specific property right; mere 
economic loss such as that caused by the noise from a nearby 
streetcar will not suffice.206 Colorado courts initially held that im­
pairment of access was noncompensable as long as the public en­
tity was making normal street improvements, such as fixing the 
grade, for the public good.207 Colorado courts struggled with this 
narrow reading of “damaged,” finding impairment of access by a 
viaduct208 and change from the original street grade200 both “ex­
traordinary” public uses and thus compensable. Colorado still in­
sists, however, that access must be cut off almost completely for 
damages to be recoverable.210 Access cases in Colorado thus are less 
likely to provide an opportunity for business losses to be compen­
sated than in a state such as California, with a more expansive 
view of when access has been taken.
E. Idaho
In applying the fair market value standard, Idaho emphasizes 
the owner’s loss, not the condemnor’s gain.211 For example, the
(1978).
204. See Board of County Comm’rs v. HAD Enterprises, 35 Colo. App, 162, 533 P.2d
45, 51 (1974).
205. Mosher v. City of Boulder, 225 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. Colo. 1964); City of Ft. Collins 
v. Wallace, 23 Colo. App. 452, 130 P. 69 (1913).
206. Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593,131 P. 409, 413 (1913); Gil­
bert v. Greeley, S.L. & Pac. Ry., 13 Colo. 501, 22 P. 814 (1889).
207. City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 P. 6, 7 (1883).
208. City of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 P. 789, 792 (1894).
209. City of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 P. 595 (1902).
210. Shaklee v. Board of County Comm’rs, 176 Colo. 559, 491 P.2d 1366 (1971) (re­
placing 1014 feet of frontage by two access points 600 feet apart considered a reasonable 
regulation); Hayutin v. Colorado Dep’t of Highways, 175 Colo. 83, 485 P.2d 896, 899 (1971) 
(circuity of route caused by median held noncompensable), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1972); Thornton v. City of Colorado Springs, 173 Colo. 357,478 P.2d 665,668 (1970) (circu­
ity of access resulting from median strip noncompensable); Troiano v. Colorado Dep’t of 
Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448, 452-56 (1970) (impairment of view, appeal of motel 
resulting from freeway viaduct held noncompensable, disapproving People v. Ricciardi, 23 
Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943)); Radinsky v. City and County of Denver, 159 Colo. 134, 
410 P.2d 644, 646-47 (1966) (nonabutting property owner not compensated for increased 
circuity of access resulting from construction of freeway exchange, where owner still had 
access and inconveniences shared by others in area); Gayton v. Department of Highways,
149 Colo. 72, 367 P.2d 899, 902 (1962) (inconvenience resulting from closure of alley where 
owner still had street access held noncompensable).
211. See, e.g., Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 619
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measure of damages applied in an early case involving condemna­
tion of an irrigation canal was the change in market value of the 
owner’s property, not the condemnor’s savings on construction 
costs as a result of the condemnation.212 The condemnor’s planned 
use may be considered, however, if it is indicative of the property’s 
marketable highest and best use.213 Unlike in California, the high­
est and best use of the property may be its use in conjunction with 
other parcels—for example, as a reservoir—as long as the joinder is 
reasonably likely.214 Conversely, if the parcel taken is part of a 
larger tract, its value must reflect any enhancement of value such 
as recreational availability resulting from its potential use in con­
junction with the larger parcel.215 Idaho also has recently stipu­
lated that both the probability and the possibility of rezoning 
should be considered in valuation, to the extent that they exert an 
effect on the current market value of the property.216
In keeping with its concern for the owner’s loss, Idaho has de­
cided several cases in which the owner’s special use for the prop­
erty was treated as the basis for fair market value. Idaho’s treat­
ment of these cases is markedly generous in light of the practice in 
other western states such as Colorado. In State v. Dunclick, Inc.,217 
a partial taking case, the portion condemned was used by defen­
dants for storing and seasoning concrete products made elsewhere 
on the property.218 The storage area was an integral part of the 
manufacturing process and no alternatives were available on the 
property. The court held that it was not error to instruct the jury 
to consider the going concern value of the manufacturing enter­
prise in estimating the value of the land with respect to the use for 
which it was peculiarly adapted.219 In an earlier case,220 Idaho al­
lowed property used for a college campus, which had no alternative 
market value, to be valued for its special use. In a much cited de­
P.2d 122, 132 (1980).
212. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irrigating Co. v. Portneuf Irrigating Co., 19 Idaho 483, 
114 P. 19 (1911).
213. Idaho Farm Dev. Co. v. Brackett, 36 Idaho 748, 213 P. 696, 698 (1923).
214. 213 P. at 698.
215. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387, 389­
90 (1972); City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 P.2d 615 (1968).
216. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 662 P.2d 237, 239-40 
(1983).
217. 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112 (1955).
218. 286 P.2d at 1114.
219. Id. at 1118.
220. Idaho W. Ry. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 
20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60 (1911).
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fense of special use valuation, the court explained:
[T]he property built up for such purposes is ordinarily expensive, 
and becomes of great value for the specific work and purpose for 
which it is established. The fact that there is no market value for 
such property affords no justification whatever for the taking of 
property without payment of just compensation.221
In measuring market value, Idaho courts attempt to come as 
close as possible to what the property might presently bring, ab­
sent effects on the market of the proposed project. Comparable 
sales data are admissible evidence, as confirming an expert’s evalu­
ation of the property or as independent evidence of the property’s 
value.222 Generally, the purchase price originally paid by the owner 
is admissible, either as evidence of present value or to rebut other 
estimates of value.223 In the discretion of the trial court, however, 
evidence of the original purchase price of the property may be re­
jected as too remote, if for example the property has increased 
massively in value because of its proximity to a freeway 
exchange.224
Idaho law at present seems somewhat confused about use of 
income capitalization as an alternative to comparable sales data for 
measuring market value. In an early case226 involving condemna­
tion of a farm, the Idaho court refused to consider evidence of ac­
tual income from the farm, on the theory that the income was too 
dependent on the owner’s skills. It did allow, however, the average 
net income which a farm of the sort in question would produce 
under average conditions, to be considered as bearing on market 
value.226 Later cases similarly allow indirect consideration of evi­
dence of income. For example, in State v. V-l Oil Company,227 
Idaho refused to allow evidence of past profits as dependent on 
business skills, but admitted evidence of the rental income, loca­
tion and economic desirability of the parcel as bearing on market 
value.228 In another case,229 the court would not value a gravel
221. 119 P. at 65.
222. State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P.2d 56, 60 (1969).
223. 454 P.2d at 60.
224. Id. at 59.
225. Idaho Farm Dev. Co. v. Brackett, 36 Idaho 748, 213 P. 696 (1923).
226. 213 P. at 699.
227. 94 Idaho 456, 490 P.2d 323 (1971).
228. 490 P.2d at 336.
229. State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 468 P.2d 306 
(1970).
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leasehold in terms of income projected from the amount of gravel 
remaining and the market value of gravel, even though it con­
cluded there was no recognized market for gravel pits, but would 
allow expected future earnings to influence market value as they 
would a hypothetical purchaser.230 Finally, a fairly recent case231 
allowed lost profits to bear on the market value of a leasehold, 
without noting the shift from income to profits.232
Because the Idaho constitution specifically mandates compen­
sation for takings only,233 Idaho courts have had some difficulty 
with cases involving loss of highway access. Owners cannot get 
compensation at all unless they can argye some property right was 
taken.234 When compensation is available, Idaho insists on a sepa­
ration between damages from the access termination itself and 
damages from traffic diversions associated more generally with the 
new project.236 In a partial taking case,236 however, Idaho appears 
once again to have allowed business losses to enter indirectly, for it 
allowed circuity of access caused by the taking to become a factor 
in assessing the market value of the remaining land.237
F. Montana
Montana eminent domain law is noteworthy for its treatment 
of mineral rich lands and for its willingness to allow replacement 
costs for special use property. At base, compensation in Montana 
rests on fair market value, measured in terms of the most valuable 
use for which the property is available.238 “Available” is inter­
preted generously to mean “marketable”;239 uses that would appeal 
to a speculator count240 unless they are purely conjectural.241 Legal
230. 468 P.2d at 314.
231. State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976). Profits argua­
bly are one step more dependent on management skill than income.
232. 546 P.2d at 403.
233. Idaho Const, art. I, § 14.
234. Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397, 401 (1958).
235. State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399, 405 (1976); Mabe v. 
State, 86 Idaho 254, 385 P.2d 401, 405 (1963).
236. State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 468 P.2d 306
(1970).
237. 468 P.2d at 315.
238. State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288 P. 181, 185 (1930).
239. State Highway Comm’n v. Woodcock, 147 Mont. 291, 411 P.2d 357, 358 (1965).
240. State Highway Comm’n v. Antonioli, 145 Mont. 411, 401 P.2d 563, 566 (1965); 
State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288 P. 181, 185 (1930).
241. Montana State Highway Comm’n v. Jacobs, 150 Mont. 322, 435 P.2d 274, 277 
(1967).
HeinOnline -- 1984 Utah L. Rev. 459 1984
460 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1984: 429
restrictions on property may result in a holding that it is not avail­
able for a proposed use; for example, property subject to flood zon­
ing restrictions was found not usable for residential 
development.242
The distinction between uses that would appeal to a specula­
tor, which may be considered, and merely speculative estimates of 
value, which may not, emerged in a series of Montana cases involv­
ing land with mineral wealth. The defendant may not guess about 
whether the land is of value for mining purposes.24* He may, how­
ever, assume there is a speculative market for known reserves.244 In 
such a case, the measure $ f compensation is the market value of 
the land with reserves, not the value of the reserves themselves.
When a market for comparable property does exist, Montana 
regards sales data as “the ultimate criterion” of just compensa­
tion.246 It may be supplemented by evidence of the original 
purchase price, adjusted to date.246 When capitalization of income 
gives a less conjectural measure of value than sales data, it may be 
used as a substitute.247
When property has a special use for which there is no ready 
market, Montana will allow reproduction cost to serve as an alter­
nate measure of value. For example, replacement cost was used as 
the measure of compensation for a one-man cement plant, al­
though the owner’s estimate of what it would cost to replace his 
primitive facility was rejected as too speculative.248 Replacement 
cost also was approved as the measure of compensation for a mag­
got ranch, conveniently located near a slaughterhouse.249 Most re­
cently, an owner was allowed to recover the loss in value of special 
confinement buildings of a hog farm, measured by the cost of the
242. In re Creation of West Great Falls Flood Control and Drainage Dist. ex rel. 
Greenwood, 648 P.2d 297 (Mont. 1982).
243. State Highway Comm’n v. Metcalf, 160 Mont. 164, 500 P.2d 951, 955 (1972).
244. State Highway Comm’n v. Antonioli, 145 Mont 411, 401 P.2d 563, 566 (1965).
245. State Highway Comm’n v. Tubbs, 147 Mont. 296, 411 P.2d 739, 742 (1966).
246. State Highway Comm’n v. Vaughan, 155 Mont. 277, 470 P.2d 967, 972 (1970).
247. State v. Olsen, 166 Mont. 139, 531 P.2d 1330, 1332 (1975); see also State ex rel. 
Highway Comm’n v. Keneally, 142 Mont. 256, 384 P.2d 770, 776 (1963) (capitalization of 
income is relevant to a decrease in market value, but does not allow for loss of business 
damages); State v. Heltborg, 140 Mont. 196,369 P.2d 521, 523-25 (1962) (allowing testimony 
relating to capitalization of income); State v. Peterson, 134 Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617, 623-24
(1958) (income evidence admissible but not conclusive of market value).
248. Alexander v. State Highway Comm’n, 147 Mont. 367, 412 P.2d 414, 415 (1966). 
See generally Comment, The Montana Law of Valuation in Eminent Domain, 34 M o n t. L. 
Rev. 90 (1973).
249. Department of Highways v. Schumacher, 180 Mont. 329, 590 P.2d 1110, 1115
(1979).
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buildings less salvage value.250 In this case, a frontage road con­
structed on the taken land threatened to cause such increased 
stress among the hogs that the confinement buildings had only sal­
vage value.251
G. Nevada
Nevada’s sparse eminent domain cases emphasize that justice 
requires compensation to be “real, substantial, full and ample.”258 
Property must be valued in light of its highest best use,253 and 
market value must include any factors that a reasonable business­
man would consider in purchasing.25* Those factors must include 
legal restrictions on the property, such as beachfront access en­
cumbrances in the deed, insofar as they would affect a buyer’s de­
cision.256 They also may include the availability of local bank loans 
for property development.256 The highest and best use may encom­
pass routine zoning changes257 that would appeal to a willing 
buyer. The most striking contrast to the practice in some other 
states is Nevada’s willingness to allow a single parcel of land to be 
valued on a lot-by-lot, dissected basis, if its best use is as a 
subdivision.258
Income capitalization may be used as evidence of market 
value, as long as an appropriate foundation is laid for the capitali­
zation rate.259 Notably, Nevada allows potential income to be used 
as a basis for capitalization. Potential income from the sale of sub­
divided lots, discounted to present value, has been held relevant to 
a determination of fair market value,260 as has market rental even
250. State ex ret. Dep’t of Highways v. Howery, 664 P.2d 1387 (Mont. 1983).
251. Id. at 1390.
252. Sorenson v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 92 Nev. 445, 552 P.2d 487, 488 
(1976); Tacchino v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 89 Nev. 150,508 P.2d 1212,1213 (1970).
253. Sorenson v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 92 Nev. 445, 552 P.2d 487, 488 
(1976).
254. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Linnecke, 86 Nev. 257, 468 P.2d 8, 11 (1970); 
State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Shaddock, 75 Nev. 392, 344 P.2d 191, 194 (1959).
255. Skyland Water Co. v. Tahoe-Douglas Dist, 95 Nev. 289, 593 P.2d 1066, 1067
(1979).
256. Clark County School Dist v. Mueller, 76 Nev. 11, 348 P.2d 164, 168 (1960).
257. Sorenson v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 92 Nev. 445, 552 P.2d 487, 488 
(1976).
258. Tacchino v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 89 Nev. 150, 508 P.2d 1212, 1214 
(1973).
259. Eikelberger v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 83 Nev. 306, 429 P.2d 555, 557 
(1967); State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Campbell, 80 Nev. 23, 388 P.2d 733 (1964).
260. Tacchino v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 89 Nev. 150, 508 P.2d 1212, 1214 
(1973).
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though the property is currently leased for less than its rental 
value.261 Thus, Nevada seems particularly liberal among the west­
ern states in treatment of income capitalization. Nevada does not 
appear to have faced the issues of special use property or business 
losses.
In the leading case262 involving loss of access, moreover, Ne­
vada appears to be sympathetic to compensation for business 
losses.263 When direct access was replaced by circuitous access via a 
frontage road, the court held that such a substantial impairment 
constituted a taking of the owner’s easement of access.264 The 
court cited approvingly Arizona’s approach to compensation for 
loss of access, which includes business losses, and noted that com­
pensation should reflect the businessman’s judgment.265
H. New Mexico
Apart from a series of cases concerning severance damages, 
New Mexico compensation law is relatively limited. Fair market 
value is to be determined by considering all probable uses for the 
property.266 New Mexico agrees with Alaska that special value to 
the condemnor is not the measure of compensation, even when the 
condemnor takes something of value from the land, such as soil for 
roadfill.267 The owner’s planned use is considered as bearing on 
market value, if it is feasible, but one New Mexico holding268 addi­
tionally allowed into evidence a design showing how the owner’s 
use could be achieved compatibly with the taking.269
In determining market value, the jury may hear evidence of 
comparable sales, income capitalization and reproduction costs, ap­
parently in all kinds of cases.270 The original purchase price of the 
property, while not conclusive, is relevant.271 The market value of a
261. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Shaddock, 75 Nev. 392, 344 P.2d 191, 194
(1959).
262. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Linnecke, 86 Nev. 257, 468 P.2d 8 (1970).
263. 468 P.2d at 11.
264. Id. at 9, 11.
265. Id.
266. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Pelletier, 76 N.M. 555, 417 P.2d 46, 49-50 
(1966).
267. Board of County Comm’rs v. Vargas, 76 N.M. 369, 415 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1966).
268. State v. Kistler-Collister Co., 88 N.M. 221, 539 P.2d 611 (1975).
269. 539 P.2d at 615.
270. State Highway Comm’n v. Martinez, 81 N.M. 442, 468 P.2d 413, 414 (1970).
271. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 394, 456 P.2d 868, 870 
(1969).
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leasehold with improvements may extend beyond the term of the 
lease if renewal is likely.278
New Mexico has held that the condemnee may not recover 
damages for business losses caused by temporary inconvenience.273 
However, the owner may recover for loss of growing crops and 
other damage to land, such as the cost of restoring the surface to 
its former level.274 Costs of relocating or selling improvements are 
generally not compensable, although they might bear on market 
value computations.276 Nonetheless, New Mexico did award addi­
tional compensation for the cost of constructing flood control de­
vices in a partial taking case,276 apparently on the theory that the 
state has a duty to protect the landowner from the possibility of 
flooding caused by the new use of the condemned property.277
New Mexico holds that highway access is a property right, 
which may not be taken or damaged without compensation.278 In 
general, compensation is not owed for temporary impairments,279 
however, or for reasonable inconvenience caused by increased 
travel distances.280
I. Oregon
Oregon consistently is one of the most stringent states in 
awarding compensation. Oregon does base compensation on fair 
market value, determined by the owner’s loss, not the condemnor’s 
gain.281 Property is to be valued by considering uses for which it is 
reasonably available, including rehabilitation.282 Particular needs 
that the state has for property may be considered if the property is
272. 456 P.2d at 873.
273. State v. Kistler-Collister Co., 88 N.M. 221, 539 P.2d 611, 616 (1975).
274. Tranawestem Pipe Line Co. v. Yandell, 69 N.M. 448, 367 P.2d 938, 944 (1961).
275. Board of Trustees v. B.J. Serv., Inc., 75 N.M. 459, 406 P.2d 171 (1965).
276. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Steinkraus, 76 N.M. 617, 417 P.2d 431 
(1966).
277. 417 P.2d at 434.
278. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 104, 419 P.2d 759, 760 
(1966).
279. Hill v. State Highway Comm’n, 85 N.M. 689, 516 P.2d 199, 201 (1973).
280. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Brock, 80 N.M. 80, 451 P.2d 984, 986-87
(1969); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36,411 P.2d 1009,1011-12 
(1966).
281. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Mayem, 19 Or. App. 234, 526 P.2d 1390, 
1391 (1974); Santiam Lumber Co. v. Conhaim, 218 Or. 220, 344 P.2d 247, 249 (1959); State 
ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Arnold, 218 Or. 43, 341 P.2d 1089, 1092-93, modified, 343 
P.2d 1113 (1959); Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Taffe, 67 Or. 102, 134 P. 1024, 1028 (1913).
282. City of Portland v. Nudelman, 45 Or. App. 425, 608 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1980).
HeinOnline -- 1984 Utah L. Rev. 463 1984
464 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1984: 429
marketable for that use to others as well.283 The defendant’s 
planned uses may be considered,284 even if they require a zoning 
change,286 as long as they are not too speculative.286
Sales data are the basic evidence of fair market value. Oregon 
allows market data to be supplemented in a number of ways, but 
often insists that supplementation may occur only when market 
data are unavailable. Sales data may be supplemented by evidence 
of the purchase price, if the purchase was not too long ago to be a 
helpful indicator of value.287 Capitalization of rentals is a permissi­
ble measure of market value, but capitalization of profits is not.288 
As in Colorado, evidence of farm income may be used as a basis for 
capitalization, but only if it is income already received from the 
particular farm being valued.289 The rental basis for capitalization 
must not be speculative.290 In estimating the market value of a 
lease, business profits may not be considered unless no other valu­
ation methods are available.291 Minerals are valued by taking the 
fair market value of the aggregate.292
In valuing special use property, Oregon insists that replace­
ment cost may be considered only if market transaction data is
283. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Arnold, 218 Or. 43, 341 P.2d 1089,1093, 
modified, 343 P.2d 1113 (1959) (cinder cone marketable for gravel to others than state).
284. State v. Assembly of God, Pentecostal, 230 Or. 167, 368 P.2d 937, 940-41 (1962) 
(not error to allow testimony about church’s landscaping plans). But cf. State ex rel. State 
Highway Comm’n v. Morehouse Holding Co., 225 Or. 62,357 P.2d 266,269 (1960) (failure to 
give instruction to jury not to consider any intentions or plans held not reversible error).
285. Unified Sewerage Agency v. Duyck, 33 Or. App. 375, 576 P.2d 816, 819 (1978); 
State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Compton, 9 Or. App. 264, 490 P.2d 743, 746-47
(1971), rev’d on other grounds, 265 Or. 339, 507 P.2d 13 (1973); State ex rel. State Highway 
Comm’n v. Oswalt, 1 Or. App. 449, 463 P.2d 602, 604 (1970).
286. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Compton, 265 Or. 339, 507 P.2d 13, 16 
(1973); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Anderson, 234 Or. 328, 381 P.2d 707 (1963).
287. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Empire Bldg. Material Co., 17 Or. App. 
616, 523 P.2d 584, 587 (1974).
288. Compare City of Medford v. Bessonnette, 255 Or. 53, 463 P.2d 865, 869 (1970) 
(evidence of loss of rental income due to decreased parking space), with State v. Cerruti, 188 
Or. 103, 214 P.2d 346, 351 (1950) (evidence of capitalization of profits not admitted for 
agricultural land).
289. State v. Cerruti, 188 Or. 103, 214 P.2d 346, 350 (1950) (citing City & County of 
Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. I ll, 113 P.2d 999, 1001 (1941)); cf. Idaho Farm Dev. Co. v. 
Brackett, 36 Idaho 748, 213 P. 696, 699 (1923) (allowing evidence of average income for 
farm).
290. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Compton, 265 Or. 339, 507 P.2d 13, 16 
(1973).
291. City of Portland v. Postill, 123 Or. 579, 263 P. 896, 900 (1928) (evidence of busi­
ness profits held to be error).
292. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Arnold, 218 Or. 43, 341 P.2d 1089, 1104 
(land was not a “natural warehouse”), modified, 343 P.2d 1113 (1959).
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“impossible” to obtain.293 Oregon has suggested that the cost of 
substitute facilities is required as compensation only when the con- 
demnee is under a legal duty to replace the property.294 Thus, an 
owner of special use property will be less favorably treated in Ore­
gon than in states like Idaho, especially if the property is marketa­
ble for any purpose whatsoever.
In Oregon, moving expenses and other consequential damages 
are noncompensable.2915 Compensation is not available for person­
alty made less useful by the taking, such as a restaurant’s cooking 
equipment.296 Nor is it available for personalty damaged by the 
taking, such as cattle injured in a move made necessary by the tak­
ing.297 As elsewhere, however compensation is granted for 
fixtures.298
Oregon’s constitution provides for compensation for takings 
only.299 Early Oregon decisions held that even complete termina­
tion of access was not compensable300 unless the severance oc­
curred because the street had been appropriated for a private use 
such as a street railroad.301 Oregon now holds that recovery is 
available for deprivation of all reasonable access,302 and severance 
damages also may be available if part of the land is appropri­
ated.303 Oregon maintains strict standards about what constitutes
293. State ex rel. Bd. of Higher Educ. v. First Methodist Church, 6 Or. App. 492, 488 
P.2d 835, 836 (1971) (where church youth center adjoined college campus there was no simi­
lar facility for valuation).
294. 488 P.2d at 837.
295. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Or. 393, 281 P.2d 
707, 723 (1955). Indeed, through removing its fixtures and seeking moving expenses, 
Superbilt found its former factory valued as a warehouse for the purpose of determining 
market value.
296. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Demarest, 263 Or. 590, 503 P.2d 682, 689
(1972).
297. State Dep’t of Transp. v. Glenn, 288 Or. 17, 602 P.2d 253, 255 (1979).
298. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Empire Bldg. Material Co., 17 Or. App. 
616, 523 P.2d 584, 591 (1974).
299. Or. C o n st, art. I, § 18.
300. Wilson v. City of Portland, 132 Or. 509, 285 P. 1030 (1930); Barrett v. Union 
Bridge Co., 117 Or. 220, 243 P. 93, 93-94 (1926); Brand v. Multnomah County, 38 Or. 79, 60 
P. 390, 392 (1900).
301. Kurtz v. Southern Pac. Co., 80 Or. 213, 155 P. 367, 369 (1916); Sandstrom v. 
Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 75 Or. 159, 146 P. 803, 804-05 (1915).
302. Douglas County v. Briggs, 34 Or. App. 409, 578 P.2d 1261 (1978), aff’d, 286 Or. 
151,593 P.2d 1115 (1979); Ail v. City of Portland, 136 Or. 654,299 P. 306,310 (1931); Cooke 
v. City of Portland, 136 Or. 233, 298 P. 900, 901 (1931).
303. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Burk, 200 Or. 211, 265 P.2d 783, 795 
(1954).
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deprivation of access, however; a recent case304 held that the owner 
of duplexes was not deprived of access because the front of the 
property could be reached, in spite of the fact that the driveway to 
garages in the back was completely closed and no other land re­
mained on which to build a substitute.805
J. Utah
The measure of the defendant’s loss in Utah is fair market 
value in money, determined by considering highest and best use in 
light of all uses for which the property is reasonably available. 
These may include uses requiring zoning changes306 and uses made 
possible by zoning changes in anticipation of the improvement.307 
Unlike Nevada, Utah will not allow the property owner to specu­
late on the possibility of subdividing a parcel.308 Utah also has sug­
gested that the uses considered together in determining value must 
be compatible,309 but at least one case appears to have given recov­
ery for noncompatible uses.810
Comparable sales data are basic evidence of fair market 
value,311 but are supplemented in the many Utah cases involving 
property for which no real market exists. Utah admits evidence of 
the purchase price if it is not too remote,312 and appears to be
304. Boese v. City of Salem, 40 Or. App. 381, 595 P.2d 822 (1979).
305. 595 P.2d at 823. It is fair to Bay that Oregon generally is stringent in determining 
when a taking has occurred. Zoning is not a taking unless the owner is precluded from all 
economically feasible use. Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 581 P.2d
50, 63 (1978). Precondemnation activities will amount to a taking if rights to use have been 
effectively snuffed out, for example, for ten years. Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Highway 
Comm’n, 274 Or. 49, 545 P.2d 105, 109 (1976). For shorter term deprivations, the con- 
demnee may recover only the value of the use of the land. City of Silverton v. Porter, 28 Or. 
App. 415, 559 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1977).
306. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167,170-71, 397 P.2d 463, 465
(1964) (citing 4 P. N ichols, P. R ohan, J. Sackman & R. Van B runt, supra note 69, § 
12.322(1)).
307. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 321, 452 P.2d 872, 874
(1969).
308. State ex rel. Engineering Comm’n v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 251, 291 P.2d 1028, 
1029-30 (1956).
309. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 42, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (1957).
310. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 311-12, 352 P.2d 693, 696-97 (1960). 
The defendant was compensated for the gravel taken and recovered severance damages in 
addition because his lambs could not cross the pit resulting from extraction of the gravel. 
Id. at 312, 352 P.2d at 697.
311. Id. at 309, 352 P.2d at 695; State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40,44, 
305 P.2d 495, 498 (1957).
312. State ex rel. State Road Comm’n v. Hopkins, 29 Utah 2d 131, 132, 506 P.2d 57, 
58 (1973).
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fairly lenient in allowing “opinion evidence of what the property 
would probably sell for” when the area is too remote for there to 
be a ready market.313 The value of mineral deposits is to be mea­
sured by considering the fair market value of the aggregate.314 Cap­
italizations of rentals316 or income816 are admissible as alternative 
measures. When the property is not put to its best use, however, 
Utah will not measure compensation by what the property could 
earn if put to its best use, although evidence of highest and best 
use still may bear on market value.317 In Utah, capitalization of 
profits generally is regarded as too speculative to be a measure of 
compensation unless the business is taken over.318
Nonetheless, where property—such as industrially valuable 
water runoff—has a specially adapted use but no ready market, 
Utah has allowed its “inherent value” to be measured by admitting 
evidence of the profitability of uses to which it is put.319 If the 
property is unique and its use requires special conditions, Utah has 
allowed replacement cost to be an appropriate method of valua­
tion, even though the defendant is under no duty to replace the 
property.320
Under the taking or damaged clause of its constitution, Utah 
grants damages for loss of access.321 It appears to be relatively gen­
erous in compensating for inconvenience, allowing recovery of in­
creased costs of operation when a parcel is severed.322
K. Washington
As elsewhere, compensation in Washington is based on the fair
313. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 309, 352 P.2d 693, 695 (1960).
314. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 42, 305 P.2d 495, 496 (1957).
315. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 445, 491 P.2d 1093, 
1095 (1971); Ogden L. & I. Ry. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62, 67-68,168 P. 548, 550-51 (1917); Hemp­
stead v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 273, 90 P. 397, 401 (1907).
316. Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 315-16,452 P.2d 869,870-71 (1969); 
State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Bingham Gas & Oil Co., 21 Utah 2d 66, 440 P.2d 260 (1956).
317. Redevelopment Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 49 (Utah 1974).
318. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 445, 491 P.2d 1093, 
1095 (1971).
319. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co., 566 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1977); 
Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278, 289-90, 142 P.2d 154, 159 (1943).
320. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co., 566 P.2d 1240,1244 (Utah 1977) 
(disapproving State ex rel. Bd. of Higher Educ. v. First Methodist Church of Ashland, 6 Or. 
App. 492, 488 P.2d 835 (1971)).
321. Utah Const, art. I, § 22; see Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 267, 90 
P. 397, 399 (1907); Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 260, 90 P. 395, 397 (1907).
322. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 298-99,495 P.2d 817, 819­
20 (1972).
HeinOnline -- 1984 Utah L. Rev. 467 1984
468 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1984: 429
market value standard.323 The defendant must be paid in money; 
he should not be required to take a promise about the condemnor’s 
use of his right324 or to accept alternative facilities.325 Fair market 
value is to.be measured by considering all uses for which the prop­
erty is reasonably available, including those involving likely zoning 
changes.326 Zoning changes made likely by the project itself, how­
ever, may not be considered.327 Potential uses may be considered, 
but not highly speculative ones such as subdivision,328 “plotting 
value” of the land in combination with other lots,329 or value of the 
land used in combination with state lands.330 The special use value 
of the land to the condemnor may be taken into account if the 
land is reasonably adapted to it and the use affects its market 
value.331
Washington is quite liberal in its rules regarding proof of fair 
market value. Comparable sales data are admissible, as is evidence 
of the purchase price.332 If condemned property was within the 
scope of the project from the time of the government’s commit­
ment, its market value must not reflect inclusion in the project.338 
Capitalization of rentals334 and income335 are available as alterna­
tive evidence. Washington courts attempt to tread a fine line be­
tween insisting that evidence of business profits is admissible only 
to determine available uses on the theory that profits depend on
323. State v. McDonald, 98 Wash. 2d 521, 656 P.2d 1043,1047 (1983) (en banc).
324. State ex rel. Poison Logging Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Wash. 2d 545, 119 P.2d 
694, 706 (1941).
325. State v. McDonald, 98 Wash. 2d 521, 656 P.2d 1043, 1049 (1983) (en banc).
326. State v. Sherrill, 13 Wash. App. 250, 543 P.2d 598, 605 (1975); State v. Motor 
Freight Terminals, Inc., 57 Wash. 2d 442, 357 P.2d 861, 863 (1960).
327. State v. Kruger, 77 Wash. 2d 105, 459 P.2d 648 (1969).
328. State v. Swarva, 86 Wash. 2d 29, 541 P.2d 982, 984 (1975); City of Medina v. 
Cook, 69 Wash. 2d 574, 418 P.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1966); cf. Chase v. City of Tacoma, 23 
Wash. App. 12, 594 P.2d 942, 944-45 (1979) (developed versus undeveloped land).
329. State v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass’n., 64 Wash. 2d 756, 394 P.2d 218, 220
(1964).
330. State v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 69 Wash. 2d 24, 416 P.2d 675, 678-79
(1966); Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83,104 P. 267, 269 (1909).
331. Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Northern Pac. Ry., 107 Wash. 378, 181 P. 898, 901 
(1919) (citing Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878)).
332. Chase v. City of Tacoma, 23 Wash. App. 12, 594 P.2d 942, 944 (1979).
333. Lange v. State, 86 Wash. 587, 547 P.2d 282, 286 (1976) (en banc) (citing United 
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942)).
334. State v. Hobart, 5 Wash. App. 469, 487 P.2d 635, 637-38 (1971); Seattle & M.R. 
Co. v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244, 70 P. 498, 501 (1902).
335. State v. Obie Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 943, 516 P.2d 233, 236-37 
(1973); City of Renton v. Scott Pac. Terminal, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 364, 512 P.2d 1137,1141
(1973).
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managerial ability,336 and admitting that income from the property 
may also be largely due to skill.337 Evidence of the amount and 
value of mineral resources is admitted as the best measure of the 
value of mineral lands, although the-defendant may not base his 
estimate of value on a multiplication of units and price.338 The 
owner’s sentimental attachment to the land and unwillingness to 
sell are not to be considered;339 loss of view and similar amenities 
are relevant only as they affect fair market value.340 Replacement 
cost less depreciation may be considered “whenever the structures 
are well adapted to the land on which they stand,”341 regardless of 
whether market data are available.342 Loss of personalty, however, 
is not compensable in Washington.343
L. Wyoming
Wyoming’s scanty eminent domain cases indicate adherence to 
a relatively traditional fair market value approach. They include a 
longstanding holding that fair market value is to be determined on 
the basis of all uses for which land may be adapted, excluding re­
mote and speculative uses.344 Comparable sales are the best evi­
dence of market value; even data of sales to the condemning au­
thority are admissible, if the sales were voluntary.345 When there 
have been no recent sales of similar property, expert testimony 
may extrapolate fair market value from aggregate values of sales of 
other neighboring property.346 Where the plaintiff is denied use of 
his land, as by flooding, market rental rates may be used as a valid
336. City of Renton v. Scott Pac. Terminal, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 364, 512 P.2d 1137, 
1141 (1973); City of Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 P. 199, 204 (1910).
337. State v. Obie Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 943, 516 P.2d 233, 236-37
(1973); City of Renton v. Scott Pac. Terminal, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 364, 512 P.2d 1137,1141
(1973).
338. State v. Hobart, 5 Wash. App. 469, 487 P.2d 635, 638 (1971); State v. Rowley, 74 
Wash. 2d 328, 444 P.2d 695, 696-97 (1968); State v. Larson, 54 Wash, 2d 86, 338 P.2d 135, 
136 (1959); Seattle & M.R. Co. v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244, 70 P. 498, 504 (1902).
339. Port Townsend Co. v. Barbare, 46 Wash. 275, 89 P. 710, 710-11 (1907).
340. Housing Auth. of Seattle v. Brown, 68 Wash. 2d 485,413 P.2d 635 (1966) (loss of 
view).
341. State v. Wilson, 6 Wash. App. 443, 493 P.2d 1252, 1257 (1972).
342. City of Renton v. Scott Pac. Terminal, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 364, 512 P.2d 1137, 
1141-42 (1973); State v. Wilson, 6 Wash. App, 443, 493 P.2d 1252, 1257 (1972).
343. See State v. Evans, 96 Wash. 2d 119, 634 P.2d 845, 846 (1981), opinion changed, 
97 Wash. 2d 724, 649 P.2d 633 (1982).
344. Edwards v. City of Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677, 688 (1911).
345. City of Cheyenne v. Frangos, 487 P.2d 804, 805-06 (Wyo. 1971).
346. State Highway Cnmm’n v. McNiff, 395 P.2d 29 (Wyo. 1964).
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indicator of damages.847
Consequential damages directly attributable to a project such 
as damages from construction, are compensable in Wyoming.348 
Other consequential losses to the owner, however, are not. Business 
losses are noncompensabie.349 Personal inconvenience, annoyance, 
fear, and discomfort are not compensable unless they reduce what 
a buyer would be willing to pay for the property.360 When new 
highway construction changes traffic patterns, resulting business 
losses are noncompensabie as long as preexisting access rights are 
not cut off.361
IV. S e v e r a n c e  D am a g es
Condemnations in which the state takes only a portion of the 
defendant’s property often place the most severe strains on the 
market value model of compensation. The owner may be left with 
a truncated parcel that does not serve his needs, or any other 
needs, very well. On the other hand, the owner may continue to 
hold a piece of land made vastly more valuable by the improve­
ment, such as land adjoining a freeway exit. Three issues in the 
analysis of partial takings are particularly relevant to the market 
value issue. First is the problem of deciding when the owner’s 
holdings form part of an integrated whole, so that the condemna­
tion should be treated as a partial taking rather than a taking of 
one parcel held by an owner of other parcels. Second is the selec­
tion of methods for valuing the part taken and damages to be paid 
for the remainder. Third is whether to allow benefits from the pub­
lic project for which the property was taken to offset the condem­
nation award. At each of these points in the analysis, courts in the 
western states appear to stretch the market value model beyond 
recognition.
A. Partial Takings
The traditional rule for determining when a piece of land 
should be viewed as part of a whole for eminent domain purposes
347. Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 562 P.2d 287, 300 (Wyo. 1977).
348. Wyoming Highway Dep’t v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1346-47 (Wyo. 1978).
349. State Highway Comm’n v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390, 396 (Wyo. 1966); Sheridan Drive- 
In Theatre, Inc. v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 599 (Wyo. 1963).
350. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 438-39 (Wyo. 1982); State Highway 
Comm’n v. Scrivner, 641 P.2d 735, 738-39 (Wyo. 1982).
351. State Highway Comm’n v. Scrivner, 641 P.2d 735, 738-39 (Wyo. 1982).
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is the “ larger parcel” test. Under this test, the condemnation is not 
a partial taking unless the part taken and the part remaining are: 
1) contiguous, 2) under the same ownership, and 3) put to the 
same use.352 Thus, a defendant who leased tidelands for lumber 
storage and shipping for its planing mill was denied severance 
damages for loss of the tidelands because the mill was on the other 
side of a public highway.303 The larger parcel test stems from insis­
tence that compensation is due only for “the property” taken by 
the state; insistence on contiguity, for example, forecloses compen­
sation for extensive economic loss when the property is not a phys­
ical unit.
More recently, however, courts have moved away from the 
larger parcel test, toward treating unity of use as the determinative 
factor.854 California employs a functional test: common contractual 
arrangements are sufficient for unity of ownership355 and relatively 
permanent interconnected use may outweigh physical separa­
tion.356 For example, the owners were awarded severance damages 
for loss of a parcel several blocks away, which they had purchased 
to meet parking requirements for their medical building.357 Oregon 
likewise allows severance damages when the property has been 
used as a unit or adapted for integral use.858 This emphasis on 
unity of use grants compensation to owners based on investment 
decisions and economic expectations, rather than physical damage 
to property or outright deprivation of rights. Alaska has gone even
352. 4 P. Nichols, P. Rohan, J. Sackman & D. Van Brunt, supra note 69, § 14.3; 
Sinnet, Offsetting Special Benefits and the Larger Parcel in Eminent Domain, 1 Gonz. L. 
R ev. 77, 83-84 (1966).
353. City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 151 Cal. 392,153 P. 705,707 
(1915).
354. See, e.g., State v. McDonald, 98 Wash. 2d 521, 656 P.2d 1043,1047-48 (1983) (en 
banc) (where parcels are separated physically, unity of use is an important factor in estab­
lishing contiguity for “ large parcel”  text); State Highway Comm’n v. Renfro, 161 Mont. 251, 
505 P.2d 403, 407 (1973) (three noncontiguous ranch parcels cut apart by new highway); 
State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 468 P.2d 306, 311-312
(1970) (unity of title subordinate to unity of use; not necessary that owner have the same 
type of property interest in entire parcel).
355. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Nyrin, 256 Cal. App. 2d 288, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
905, 911 (1967).
356. City of Los Angeles v. Wolfe, 6 Cal. 3d 326, 491 P.2d 813, 815-20, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
21, 23-28 (1971). The recent California eminent domain statute does not define “ larger par­
cel,”  apparently to allow further judicial development of this approach. Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code § 1263.410 (Deering 1981) (Law Revision Commission Comment).
357. City of Los Angeles v. Wolfe, 6 Cal. 3d 326, 491 P.2d 813, 815-20, 99 Cal. Rptr.
21, 23-28 (1971).
358. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Taffe, 67 Or. 102, 134 P. 1024, 1028 (1913).
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further and rejects the larger parcel test altogether, insisting only 
that there be sufficient damage to the remainder to warrant com­
pensation, regardless of whether the part taken be physically con­
tiguous or even used for the same purpose as the remainder.359 
Under Alaska’s test, any economic damage to remaining holdings 
resulting from a taking is potentially compensable.
Vestiges of the larger parcel test can be seen in the Utah rule 
that to recover severance damages, the defendant must show phys­
ical injury to the land itself from the improvement, such as 
blocked light, restricted size or shape, impaired access, smoke or 
noise.360 Emphasis on the physical relation between the part taken 
and the part remaining also can be seen in the rule that severance 
damages may not be awarded for harms caused by portions of the 
public improvement not physically located on the parcel taken. 
The recent California eminent domain statute rejected this rule 
despite a number of cases going the other way.361 Of the western 
states, New Mexico is the only one that apparently still insists on 
the larger parcel test. Even in New Mexico, however, the owner’s 
other holdings may augment a damage award to the extent that 
they affect the market value of the parcel taken.362
B. Measuring Damages in Partial Takings
The rule for measuring damages in a partial taking is another 
point at which owners’ economic losses seep into compensation 
awards. There are two major proposals here. The first is the 
“before and after” rule,368 that in a partial taking compensation 
should be the difference between the fair market value of the en­
tire parcel before the taking and the remainder afterwards. This 
rule most directly tracks the owner’s marketable loss,364 but has 
been criticized extensively. Under this rule, the owner will receive 
no compensation if the public improvement increases the market 
value of the remainder beyond the entire parcel’s original 
value—the situation when freeway construction leaves owners of
359. Babinec v. State, 512 P.2d 563, 567 (Alaska 1973).
360. See State Road Comm’n v. Rohan, 26 Utah 2d 202,487 P.2d 857 (1971); Southern 
Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 311, 352 P.2d 693, 696-97 (1960); State v. Ward, 112 
Utah 452, 459, 189 P.2d 113, 117 (1948).
361. Cal. Civ. Pboc. Code § 1263.420(b) (Deering 1981) (Law Revision Commission 
Comment).
362. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Gray, 81 N.M. 399, 467 P.2d 725, 729
(1970).
363. 1 L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 64.
364. Id.
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unimproved ranchland with hundreds of feet of off-ramp frontage. 
Despite the fact that they have lost land, condemnees will be 
treated no differently than their neighbors, who have lost nothing 
and gained similarly. Critics of the rule thus argue that it allows 
the state to take rights for nothing.360 Their contention is irrefuta­
ble on the assumption that compensation must be in money. But 
the owner does receive something in return for the condemnation: 
the public improvement, which by assumption benefits him in a 
case in which the before and after rule yields no compensation. It 
is simply that his benefit is shared with others, who have not paid 
for it in the same way.
The second proposal for measuring damages in a partial taking 
is the value plus damages approach.366 The value of the land taken 
is calculated and decline in the market value of the remainder is 
then added onto the compensation award as “severance damages.” 
There is always a sense in which severance damage awards 
overcompensate the owner: the damages are not paid for rights ac­
tually taken. In this sense, the recipient of severance damages is 
treated differently than his neighbor, who may have lost as much 
or more from the public improvement but has not had the good 
fortune to have had rights actually condemned. The standard justi­
fication for this difference is that rights of the owner were appro­
priated, but compensation for these losses already has been 
awarded. In perhaps the height of generosity, however, the Uni­
form Eminent Domain Code recommends that compensation be 
the larger of the before and after differential or the value plus 
damages measure.367
Some version of the value plus damages approach is the law in 
all of the western states, except possibly New Mexico,368 which has
365. See, e.g., Denyer-Green, Agricultural Compensation: The Injustice of Market 
Value in Severance Cases, 1980 J. Planning & Envtl. L. 505, 506 (measure of compensa­
tion in partial takings cases should be price owner would pay for the portion taken).
366. 1 L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 64.
367. Uniform Eminent Domain Code § 1002(b), 13 U.L.A. 99-100 (1980).
368. Alaska Stat. § 9.55.310(a) (2)-.310(a) (3) (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12- 
1122(A)(2) to -1122(A)(3) (1982); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1263.410(a) (Deering 1981); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 38-1-114 (1973); Idaho Code § 7-711 (Supp. 1984); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 37.110 
(1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42A-1-26 (1981); Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1953); Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 8.04.080 (1961); Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-203 (1977); see State ex rel. Dep’t of High­
ways v. Lehman, 172 Mont. 480, 565 P.2d 303, 306 (1977); State ex rel. State Highway 
Comm’n v. Hooper, 259 Or. 555, 488 P.2d 421, 423-24 (1971). A recent Washington case, 
however, erroneously equated value plus damages with the before and after rule. See State 
v. McDonald, 98 Wash. 2d 521,656 P.2d 1043,1047 (1983) (en banc). Washington also is the 
only state in the west that allows benefits resulting from the project to be offset against the
HeinOnline -- 1984 Utah L. Rev. 473 1984
474 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1984: 429
expressed adherence to the before and after rule, albeit somewhat 
modified since “ early territorial days.”309 The extent to which the 
value plus damages rule actually does inflate compensation awards 
depends in part on how each portion of the award is calculated. 
Consider first the award for the parcel actually taken. Partial tak­
ings cases frequently involve segments of land that would not be 
sold separately, such as strips of frontage. Some courts attempt 
when possible to arrive at a separate assessment of the market 
value of the condemned portion;370 others require computing the 
value of the entire parcel and compensating on a proportional basis 
for the part taken;371 still others will award the owner the greater 
of these two measures.372 Compensation on a proportional basis 
gives the owner a windfall when the parcel taken is the least valua­
ble segment of his land. Compensation on separate valuation is 
most likely to give the owner a windfall when he gets top value for 
the parcel taken (say, frontage) and then is left with a parcel of 
newly augmented value (say, new frontage on a better road).373 
Recognition of this possibility has led Oregon sensibly to refuse to 
consider frontage value of the land taken when the defendant re­
ceives new frontage.374
Decline in the fair market value of the remainder then is 
added onto the award for the parcel taken. Theoretically, these 
severance damages should not encompass losses already calculated 
into the market value of the land already taken, or otherwise non­
compensable losses such as loss of profits. In a number of sever­
ance damage cases, however, loss to the remainder has included 
business losses.375
If severance damages compensate the owner for injury to land,
damage award for the part taken. See infra notes 391-92 and accompanying text.
369. City of Tucumcari v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 57 N.M. 392, 259 P.2d 351, 355 
(1953). The measure of damages in a 1978 amendment, however, obviates advantages of the 
before and after rule. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42A-1-26 (1981).
370. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Church of Holy Cross Lutheran, 132 Ariz. 416, 646 
P.2d 301, 306 (1982); People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Corporation of Pres, of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 13 Cal. App. 3d 371, 91 Cal. Rptr. 532, 537 (1970); 
People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Silviera, 236 Cal. App. 2d 604, 46 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269­
70 (1965); City of Orofino v. Swayne, 95 Idaho 125, 504 P.2d 398, 401-02 (1972).
371. See, e.g., Montana Power Co. v. Wolfe, 169 Mont. 234, 545 P.2d 674, 677 (1976).
372. See, e.g., Babinec v. State, 512 P.2d 563, 568-69 (Alaska 1973).
373. See 1 L. Orgel, supra note 69, § 64.
374. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Freeman, 11 Or. App. 513, 504 P.2d 133, 
136 (1972); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Hooper, 259 Or. 555, 488 P.2d 421, 427­
28 (1971).
375. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Howery, 664 P.2d 1387, 1390-91 
(Mont. 1983).
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not for rights taken outright, the appropriate analogy might be to 
nuisance, rather than to forced sale. Several western states have 
adopted methods of limiting severance damages along lines sug­
gested by the nuisance analogy. For example, a significant group of 
Arizona cases treats cost to cure as the measure of severance dam­
ages.870 When an Arizona condemnee’s building is damaged, he re­
ceives the cost of restoring it to its predamaged condition;377 when 
his access is destroyed by a ditch, he will recover the cost of a 
bridge;378 and when parking in front of his commercial building is 
taken, he will recover the cost of a driveway to the back.379
California likewise holds that cost to cure may be the appro­
priate measure of severance damages.380 In addition, California has 
suggested that there is a duty to mitigate381 and that in determin­
ing the decline in fair market value for severance damages, the 
trier of fact may take into account available mitigation opportuni­
ties such as the purchase of substitute land.382 California also will 
compensate owners for good faith efforts to mitigate severance 
damages. For example, owners who attempted to discover the 
cause of a landslide triggered by state road construction were com­
pensated for their efforts.383 Expenses are compensable only if they 
are incurred in the effort to avoid compensable losses, however; at­
tempts to limit business losses, for example, are non- 
compensable.384
Several western states, however, emphatically reject linking 
severance damages to ameliorative efforts. Idaho will not require
376. If nuisance is the appropriate analogy to severance damages, this approach to 
compensation is not in conflict with Justice Brennan’s insistence in San Diego Gas that 
every taking requires compensation. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. On the 
issue of regulatory takings, however, Arizona also has held in an inverse condemnation suit 
that there is no taking where an injury to property is capable of reasonable rectification. 
The measure of damages is the restoration cost. City of Tucson v. Transamerica Title Ins. 
Co.., 26 Ariz. App. 42, 545 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1976).
377. Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 39 Ariz. 470, 7 P.2d 622, 627 (1932).
378. Pima County v. DeConcini, 79 Ariz. 154, 285 P.2d 609, 611 (1955).
379. Haney v. City of Tucson, 13 Ariz. App. 296, 475 P.2d 955 (1970).
380. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1263.420 (Deering 1981) (Law Revision Commission 
Comment).
381. Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129,141, 42 Cal. Rptr. 
89, 101 (1965) (en banc) (dicta).
382. City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, 1 Cal. App. 3d 384, 420-22, 82 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 25-26 (1969).
383. Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129,141, 42 Cal. Rptr.
89, 101 (1965) (en banc).
384. Orange County Flood Control Dist. v. Sunny Crest Dairy, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 3d 
742, 764-65, 143 Cal. Rptr. 803, 815-16 (1978).
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the defendant to look for or accept substitute facilities in lieu of 
severance damages.385 Oregon admits costs of adjustment to make 
the severed property usable—e.g., the cost of a new cattle fence for 
a ranch—only as they bear on the market value of the remain­
der.386 Colorado holds that there is no duty to mitigate damages 
and that the state may not claim the benefit of the defendant’s 
mitigation efforts. For example, when the state condemned part of 
a truck terminal, the defendant recovered $165,000 severance dam­
ages because the remaining property no longer was usable as a ter­
minal. Ten days later, the defendant bought substitute property 
for $260,000; it sold part of the property for $105,000 and used the 
remainder to reconstruct the terminal. Nonetheless, the court re­
fused to allow the purchase to bear on severance damage 
recovery.387
Utah holds an interesting intermediate position here. In Utah, 
when improvements must be moved because they lie in the path of 
a state right of way, the state is entitled to show restoration costs. 
The theory is that restoration costs would be taken into account by 
a willing buyer and if they are less than the decline in market 
value, the state will have to pay a smaller claim.388 For quite some 
time, Utah courts also held that the owner has a duty to mitigate 
severance damages by seeking available alternatives, such as re­
placement pasture.389 Utah recently has overruled that view, how­
ever, and now holds that there is no duty to mitigate severance 
damages.300
C. Setoffs
A final issue through which recovery in partial takings cases
385. State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112,1115-16 (1955) (availa­
bility of new warehouse site not sufficient to require modification of compensation award).
386. In re Lebanon-Shea Hill Section, 135 Or. 430, 296 P. 65, 67 (1935). When a free­
way severs agricultural land, Oregon does allow the state to provide a crossing in lieu of 
severance damages. Or. Rev. Stat. § 374.085 (1983).
387. Department of Highways v. Intermountain Terminal Co., 164 Colo. 354, 435 P.2d
391, 392-93 (1968) (en banc); see also Western Slope Gas Co. v. Lake Eldora Corp., 32 Colo. 
App. 293, 512 P.2d 641, 643 (1973) (measure of damages to residue is diminution in fair 
market value, not cost of restoring land burdened by easement to its original condition).
388. State ex rel. Road Comm’n v. Fox, 30 Utah 2d 194, 195-96, 515 P.2d 450, 451-52 
(1973).
389. State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 122 Utah 134,140, 247 P.2d 269, 272 (1952); Provo River Water Users Ass’n v. Carl­
son, 103 Utah 93, 103, 133 P.2d 777, 781 (1943).
390. Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 490 (Utah 1979); State ex 
rel. Road Comm’n v. Howes, 20 Utah 2d 246, 436 P.2d 803 (1968).
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can be adjusted to reflect actual losses more accurately is the avail­
ability of setoffs to recovery. In only one western state, how­
ever—Washington—are benefits to be set off against the portion of 
the compensation award earmarked for the land actually taken.391 
Thus, in all of the other western states, the defendant may be com­
pensated for his appropriated rights, and receive as well major 
benefits for his remaining land, simply by disclaiming any effort to 
recoup severance damages.392
Moreover, most western states severely restrict the benefits 
that may be offset against compensation awards. Lines are difficult 
to draw here, but the typical effort is to distinguish benefits that 
are peculiar to the land in question from benefits that are more 
generally shared. Montana’s rule that only benefits entirely limited 
to the property in question are to be set off appears to be the most 
favorable to the landowner. In one Montana case,393 even a depot, 
stockyards, grain elevator and side tracks built on taken land were 
not set off because they benefitted the adjoining neighborhood. 
Otherwise, Montana argues, the condemnee would be forced to ac­
cept in kind benefits instead of the money equivalent of market 
value.39* Several other states approach Montana in their insistence 
that only benefits “unique” or “ special” to the land in question be 
set off.395
California’s treatment of the general/special distinction is con­
fused, to say the least. California’s statute was drafted to allow 
judge-made law to continue to develop in this area.396 In the case 
law, special benefits are defined as those that “result from the 
mere construction of the improvement, and are peculiar to the 
land in question.”397 Direct connection was thought necessary to 
avoid setting off speculative benefits; uniqueness was thought im­
portant to avoid imposing on the defendant whose land happens to
391. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 8.04.080 (1961).
392. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Silviera, 236 Cal. App. 3d 604, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 260, 271 (1965); City of Orofino v. Swayne, 95 Idaho 125, 504 P.2d 398, 401-02 
(1972).
393. Gallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible, 57 Mont. 27, 186 P. 689 (1919).
394. 186 P. at 690-93.
395. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. DeRoos, 631 P.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981); State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60,65 (1958) (abutting highway 
not special benefit); Salt Lake & U.R. Co. v. Butterfield, 46 Utah 431, 433, 150 P. 931, 932 
(1915).
396. Cal. Civ. Pboc. Code § 1263.430 (Deering 1981) (Law Revision Commission 
Comment).
397. Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 CaL 619, 70 P. 1083,1085-86 (1902); see also Los Angeles 
County v. Marblehead Land Co., 95 Cal. App. 602, 273 P. 131, 137 (1928).
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have been taken at a cost (reduced recovery) not borne by others 
who can sell their property on the open market.398 The standard 
has caused difficulty, however, because uniqueness and direct con­
nection to the improvement do not always coincide; for example, 
all property owners abutting an improved street share a direct ben­
efit. California has allowed benefits to be set off when increased 
traffic flow made possible by a street improvement enhanced front­
age value,399 where freeway construction enhanced visibility and 
access,400 and where a water improvement project decreased flood­
ing on the defendant’s land.401 California also has refused to offset 
benefits resulting from a nearby freeway off-ramp,402 changes in 
course of a highway,403 drainage through the owner’s land404 or in­
creased demand for the defendant’s product caused by the 
improvement.405
Other states in the west are more willing to allow benefits to 
be set off against severance damages. In Arizona, Nevada and Wy­
oming, benefits can be offset if they make the property suitable for 
better uses.406 In keeping with its view that compensation awards 
extend to incidental damages, Alaska insists on a setoff for inci­
dental benefits as well.407 Oregon has construed the category of 
special benefits to include any addition to convenience brought 
about by the improvement, whether shared by others or not, but 
this construction occurred in a case involving direct freeway access 
for the land in question so perhaps is not generalizable.408 And,
398. Los Angeles County v. Marblehead Land Co., 95 Cal. App. 602, 273 P. 131, 137 
(1928).
399. City of Hayward v. Unger, 194 Cal. App. 2d 516, 15 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961).
400. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Giumarra Farms, Inc., 22 CaL App. 3d 98, 
99 Cal. Rptr. 272, 275-76 (1972); People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Home Trust Inv, Co., 
8 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 87 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1970); People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. 
Edgar, 219 Cal. App. 2d 381, 32 Cal. Rptr. 892, 894 (1963).
401. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist v. W.P. Roduner Cattle & Farming 
Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 199, 73 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 (1968).
402. Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 70 Cal. 2d 282, 449 P.2d 737, 746, 74 Cal. Rptr. 521, 
530 (1969).
403. People v. McReynolda, 31 Cal. App. 2d 219, 87 P.2d 734, 736-37 (1939).
404. Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist, 141 CaL App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401, 411 (1956).
405. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Simon Newman Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 398, 
112 Cal. Rptr. 298, 305 (1974) (gravel).
406. Defnet Land & Inv. Co. v. State ex rel. Herman, 14 Ariz. App. 96, 480 P.2d 1013, 
1015 (1971); State Highway Comm’n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 331 (Wyo. 1970); State ex rel. 
Dep’t of Highways v. Haapanen, 84 Nev. 722, 448 P.2d 703, 705 (1968).
407. State v. H ammer, 550 P.2d 820, 828 (Alaska 1976).
408. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Bailey, 212 Or. 261, 319 P.2d 906, 920
(1957).
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finally, New Mexico explicitly allows both general and special ben­
efits to be offset against compensation awards.409
V. C o n c l u s io n
Thus, it is apparent that courts in the western states have de­
parted from the market value model of compensation in a number 
of ways. Sometimes these departures amount to settled state com­
mon law doctrine. Sometimes they occur on a case-by-case basis, as 
apparent adjustments to the inequity of traditional compensation 
doctrine. These case-by-case adjustments seem especially likely 
when evidentiary rules allow juries to hear a wide range of esti­
mates of the property’s value: from sales in the local real estate 
market, to the speculative market for known mineral reserves, to 
the costs of replacing a building adapted to the owner’s special 
needs. If fairness in the sense that individuals should not bear a 
disproportionate share of the burden of a public improvement is 
an important policy consideration, however, it is desirable for some 
of these departures to be regularized by statute.
One approach to reform that has been suggested recently is to 
realign compensation practices to further a single important goal, 
such as economic efficiency. There are a number of reasons why 
current compensation practices are inefficient in the sense that 
they encourage allocations of resources that fall short of optimal­
ity. For example, pegging compensation at current market rates 
disregards benefits that cannot be marketed commercially and 
thus ignores an incentive that could keep government from taking 
over highly valued special use property.410 Similarly, it ignores the 
relocation costs associated with a taking. Market rate compensa­
tion may also encourage owners to overinvest in land at risk of be­
ing taken, if they are assured they will receive the full value of 
their investment when the taking comes to pass.411 Thus, it has 
been suggested that a measure of compensation which more accu­
rately reflects the full social costs of a taking would be what the 
owner would be willing to pay to avoid the taking 412
Even if the serious difficulties with regard to willingness to
409. Board of Comm’rs v. Gardner, 57 N.M. 478, 260 P.2d 682, 685 (1953).
410. iSee Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 79, at 619.
411. Id. at 618. However, to the extent that those investments are not incorporated in 
a market value model that relies on comparable sales data, and to the extent that compensa­
tion practices ignore factors such as replacement costs or relocation expenses, the owner’s 
overinvestment will not be protected.
412. Id. at 620.
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pay as an approximation of value are left to one side,413 full scale 
reform of eminent domain practices to promote efficiency would 
alter the values that shape our current compensation practice in 
undesirable ways. In particular, it would place on the same footing 
all reasons owners might have for being willing to pay a great deal 
to avoid a taking: from speculation on the market to longstanding 
special use to sentimental attachment. Owners who have made 
similar investments in property but who have very different sub­
jective desires to keep the property will be treated very differently, 
even when their subjective desires are not reflected in actual im­
provements to the property. The public will be placed in the posi­
tion of having to pay individuals for their attachments to land with 
resulting increases in the costs of public improvements.
Compensation also could be realigned to pay the owner a rea­
sonable return on his original investment in the property. “Reason­
able return” might be measured by the rate of return allowed in­
vestors in public utilities over the appropriate time period since 
the date of original purchase. Theoretically, this would treat in­
vestment in property as analogous to other forms of investment in 
public goods, an approach that is congenial with analogizing prop­
erty ownership to a trust relationship. But this approach ignores 
another important characteristic of property investment: property 
need not be left dormant and the owner may have been receiving a 
return on his investment all along.
An alternative measure of reasonable return is to give the 
owner his original investment, augmented by average increases in 
land values in the surrounding area. This approach reflects the fact 
that people invest in property both to earn a present return and to 
take advantage of its growth potential. But like other efforts to 
give the individual a reasonable return on investment, it fails to 
reward speculative investments that would have done better than 
the reasonable return benchmark. It also will encourage the gov­
ernment to take more property than it needs by taking advantage 
of situations in which return to the owner would fall below current
413. Even its proponents admit that willingness to pay is administratively difficult to 
measure. Id. But the difficulties are deeper. In eminent domain compensation, where the 
individual has a unique resource needed by the government—in effect, a monopoly—he will 
have the incentive to overrepresent what he is willing to pay to avoid the taking. Moreover, 
willingness to pay may be as much a reflection of ability to pay as it is of the social costs of 
the taking. See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 Phil. & Pub. 
Affairs 3 (1975); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 509 (1980); Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. Legal 
Stud. 227 (1980).
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market values. Conversely, the approach protects owners who have 
made poor investments by assuring them at least a reasonable re­
turn. Compensation policy would then place on the public the bur­
den of protecting the owner who has not invested well.
Perhaps we would do better simply to recognize that eminent 
domain compensation serves a number of different values: the need 
of the public to acquire property, the concern that the government 
not take more than it needs, the protection of investment deci­
sions, and the equitable sharing among individuals of the costs of 
improvements that benefit us all. A reexamination of some of the 
ways in which the case law has bent the notion of “market value” 
can suggest some relatively minimal statutory reforms that further 
one or several of these goals without jeopardizing the others.
First, speculative gain could be limited by restricting the no­
tion of highest and best use to exclude uses requiring legal changes 
such as changes in zoning regulations. Property owners do not have 
the right to expect that even reasonably likely zoning changes will 
actually come to pass. Speculative gain also could be curtailed by 
refusing to consider uses of the property in combination with other 
parcels (not themselves part of the parcel being taken) or use of 
the property on a subdivided unit basis. Speculation on “project 
enhancement value”—i.e., increases in value owing to the proposed 
project for which the land is taken—also could be factored out of 
compensation awards.'41'* On the other side, owners could be pro­
tected against decreases in property values that reflect the pro­
posed project, to the extent that these decreases are not avoidable 
by the owner’s own management of the property.
A separate set of reforms could treat comparable sales data 
and the evidence available as alternatives to it. Sales data are at 
least objective indicators of the property market in the area. The 
alternatives that utilize yield from the property—capitalization of 
rents or potential rents, capitalization of income (particularly when 
the property is farmed) and capitalization of profits—all to one ex­
tent or another reflect the skills of the present owner. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the owner will lose disproportion­
ately if he is not allowed to bring into evidence all of these factors, 
and that he should not incur these losses in an involuntary trans­
414. See, e.g., Uniform Eminent D omain Code § 1005(a), 13 U.L.A. 105 (1980). Per­
haps because there is little demand for common compensation practices among states, the 
Uniform Code has not been enacted by any state in the ten years since its approval by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Uniform State Laws, 
13 U.L.A. 1 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
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fer. On the other hand, these are not losses that he would be able 
to recoup in a voluntary transfer. The compromise in some 
states—that these measures may be introduced into evidence when 
comparable sales data are unavailable—is convenient but treats 
owners differently depending on a happenstance entirely unrelated 
to the taken property. But when there have been no recent local 
sales—a relatively common situation in sparsely settled areas of 
the west—some alternative to comparable sales data must be uti­
lized. Any practice here will be an adjustment among competing 
values. The solution that treats owners most equitably, while not 
imposing costs on the state beyond the land itself, is to allow into 
evidence capitalizations of rentals and income dependent on the 
land, whether or not comparable sales data also are available, but 
not to allow capitalizations of either profit or income from a busi­
ness merely located on the land.
Replacement costs are the other traditional alternative to mar­
ket value. They are likely to be reflective of the owner’s earlier 
treatment of the property and thus would involve the state in pay­
ing the owner even for investments in developing the property that 
turned out to have been economically unwise, given the local prop­
erty market. Replacement costs, therefore, should not be available 
generally as an alternative measure to comparable sales data. It 
does not follow, however, that special use property should be ig­
nored entirely. In situations in which the property has not been a 
source of private financial gain but has been used for purposes 
such as a school, library, or church, the state might decide to bear 
the extra burden of replacement costs. This would be a decision to 
protect certain socially valuable uses of property against the costs 
imposed by a government taking, not a decision to pay the owner 
the market value of his land.
Business and personal losses also are an area in which current 
compensation practices warrant rethinking. The federal relocation 
assistance program,416 which insulates both businesses and individ­
uals against the worst effects of dislocation, is a good starting 
point. The program mandates payment of actual reasonable mov­
ing expenses, or if lower, actual direct personal property losses 
from discontinuing a business. Displaced persons under the act 
also may receive reasonable expenses in searching for a replace­
415. P ub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1895 (1971); see Norfolk Redev. Hous. Auth. v. Ches­
apeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 104 S.Ct. 304 (1983).
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ment business or farm.416 Homeowners may receive reasonable 
costs of a replacement dwelling and compensation for increased 
financing costs;417 tenants can get a four-year cushion against in­
creased rents caused by the need to relocate.418 The program is a 
reasonable accommodation between recreating the landowner’s 
pretaking economic situation, at least for a while, and imposing on 
the state the costs of buying out the landowner’s entire invest­
ment. Yet it has not been fully adopted in the western states.419 
Compensating owners for loss of good will, to the extent it cannot 
be prevented reasonably by relocation or good management, will 
further insulate the involuntary loser of property against what may 
be very heavy costs. Compensating for lost good will, however, rep­
resents a public decision to protect businesses against a particular 
type of change—that imposed by the public need for land—when 
businesses are not protected against many other types of change.
Finally, severance damages are particularly in need of reform. 
The general refusal to adopt the before and after rule and the un­
willingness to set benefits off against the award for the part taken 
are part of the view that the owner must be paid money compensa­
tion for any land actually taken. Although these rules sometimes 
result in large economic gains for owners whose land over all is 
more valuable after the taking than before, at least they can be 
given a traditional property rights defense. The failure to analogize 
damages to the remainder to nuisance cannot be given this de­
fense. The remaining land is not taken, although it, or more likely 
the owner’s activities on it, may be injured economically. Tort doc­
trines, such as the duty to mitigate, should be applied to awards 
for damages to the remainder.
Eminent domain compensation illustrates the persistence of
416. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(l)-(3) (1982).
417. Id. § 4623.
418. Id. § 4624. '
419. Alaska, Colorado, Montana and Nevada have adopted the program for federal 
projects only. Alaska Stat. § 34.60.010 (1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-56-103(2) (1973); 
M ont. Code Ann. § 70-31-102(4) (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 408.443 (1979). Arizona, Idaho, 
New Mexico and Utah permit some additional compensation for state condemnation 
projects. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-961 to -974 (1977); Idaho Code §§ 40-2901 to -2913 
(1977); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-3-1 to -15 (1978) (as long as federal funding continues to be 
available); Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-12-1 to -13 (1953) (direct financial assistance including 
recording fees, properly taxes, mortgage prepayment penalties and compensation for im­
provements at market value). California, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming mandate the 
federal standards for all public works projects. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 7260 to 7276 (Deering
1982); Or. Rev. Stat. § 281.060 (1983); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 8.26.040 (Supp. 1983-84); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-7-101 to -121 (1977).
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common law accommodation of competing values. Leaving such 
choices to the common law, however, can mask real inequities.
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